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Introduction2 
The Black Sea has long been a focal point for regionalization. Both the 
EU and NATO have had a proactive policy in the region, and various 
cooperative arrangements have been made to enhance multilateral mari-
time governance in the Black Sea. Numerous regional mechanisms for 
interaction and cooperation among the littoral states have been set up, 
such as the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
(BSEC), the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership (BSF) and 
the Black Sea Initiative of the EU (BSI). In January 2011, the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution on the Black Sea, reflecting the fact that 
since 2005 the region itself has entered a new modus operandi. The Euro-
pean Parliament recognized that the Black Sea ‘is of geo-strategic impor-
tance for the energy security of the EU’, and stated: ‘given the strategic 
importance of the Black Sea region for the EU and the rather limited 
results of the BSI, a strategy should be launched to enhance the coher-
ence and visibility of EU action in the region. Such an EU Black Sea 
Strategy should be an integral part of the EU’s broader foreign and secu-
rity policy vision’ (European Parliament 2011). That report, however, is 
based on the assumption that the current level of political cooperation 
does not reflect the high number of multilateral cooperative forums in 
the region (Hedenskog 2010).3 Moreover, the effect of such regional ini-
tiatives has been called into question, not least due to the rising signifi-
cance of pipeline politics.  
 
Euro-Atlantic integration has been put on hold. The prospects for trans-
formative Europeanization commonly associated with enlargement 
processes have been replaced by selective EU engagement under the 
heading of ‘compensatory regionalism’ – engagement focused on com-
pensating EU neighbours for the disadvantages of being outside the EU, 
rather than informed by the prospect of letting them in (Emerson 2008). 
NATO-member Turkey seems further away from EU membership; and, 
although Ukraine still seeks EU association and membership, it shelved 
its NATO aspirations in 2010.  
 
In the southeastern corner of the Black Sea, the Caucasus is still strug-
gling to overcome the effects of the 2008 Russia–Georgian war, and the 
existence of the ‘de facto’ states continues to complicate regional integra-
tion. Finally, the prospect of the Black Sea as an energy hub also raises 
questions concerning the increasingly vector-dominated foreign policy of 
Ukraine and Turkey. Ukraine balances off the EU and Russia in the en-
ergy sector, while Turkey is seeking to develop a distinct foreign policy 
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2  Written by Geir Flikke. 3  According to Deborah Sanders (2009), what has been preventing multilateral mari-
time interaction in the Black Sea is tension between littoral states.  
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identity that can combine regional weight with strategic energy impor-
tance. 
The Approach of the Report 
This report discusses the Black Sea region with regard to the parameters 
of ‘shifting geopolitics’.4 The term ‘geopolitics’ is understood in the con-
texts provided by Bobo Lo in his analysis of volatile interest-based rela-
tions, and Ole Gunnar Austvik in his reading of the geopolitics of en-
ergy. Lo sees global (and regional) geopolitics as: 
 
[policies] challenging the Western-driven, positive-sum interdepen-
dency that has become discredited in many parts of the world. It is a 
hybrid phenomenon, reflecting the transitory nature of the contempo-
rary international system. (…) This geopolitics is flexible in approach, 
employing both hard and soft power and making use of multilateral, 
bilateral and unilateral mechanisms (…). The new geopolitics is not 
based on fixed and long-lasting ‘strategic partnerships’, let alone alli-
ances, but on much more supple arrangements that frequently are op-
portunistic, non-committal and volatile (Lo 2008: 6).  
 
Ole Gunnar Austvik puts a more specific energy dimension into geopoli-
tics, arguing that demands, pipeline structures, market constellations, 
transport distances, prices and resource availability all blend to form the 
geopolitics of energy. Two factors matter – imperfect markets, and re-
source control and availability. Both enhance the significance of political 
behaviour: 
 
(…) the more imperfect markets are, the more important the behav-
iour of the participants is, being political, regulative or commercial (…) 
the size and location of resources, how available they are, who controls 
them, their cost, how regional and global markets balance, market 
mechanisms, political decisions, and energy prices in general, are also 
important (Austvik 2009: 87).  
 
The paradox of this approach is that, in energy relations, no single actor 
can impose its will on any other without an economic cost. Hence, the 
region is also an arena if not for interdependence, then at least one 
where sovereignty makes little sense if interpreted in absolute terms. 
‘Territory’ also has limited value in the classical sense of geopolitics, as 
most regional territories are ‘bridges’ and ‘transit areas’, with policies that 
have been sculpted to fit these qualities. Moreover, unresolved territorial 
issues have a long history, and can only be understood in the context of 
regional rivalries and the drive for quasi-statehood in autonomous areas. 
However, this interdependency is not ‘Western-driven’, and that the po-
litical shifts in the region are a consequence of this.  
                                                 
4  For an early assessment of these shifts, see Sherr (2008). 
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About the Report 
The report provides an overview of political developments in Turkey, 
Ukraine and the South Caucasus, as well as an energy inventory of the 
Black Sea region, and discusses the regional developments that fuel bal-
ancing policies driven by interests and shifting constellations. The first 
two sections of this report (written by Einar Wigen and by Geir Flikke) 
emphasize the volatility of energy partnerships based on transport pro-
posals and the impact of political decisions and volatile energy markets 
on interaction around the Black Sea. Concerning the South Caucasus, 
Helge Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø debate the genesis of the de facto states 
that continue to have a significant imprint on relations in that area. While 
these are not newcomers, their significance for regional stability was 
highlighted in the short August 2008 conflict between Georgia and Rus-
sia.  
 
The findings and recommendations of the report are presented in a sepa-
rate concluding chapter. In summary, we may note that the report argues 
that the reach of European and trans-Atlantic institutions into the Black 
Sea region has encountered clearly articulated challenges. First, with the 
reorientation of the foreign and security policies of states (Ukraine and 
Turkey); second, with the complexity of energy politics (Ukraine, the 
Caucasus and Turkey); and third, with Russian recognition of the de 
facto states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, coupled with a more distinct 
presence in the region of the South Caucasus.  
Turkey: A Strategic Backdrop5 
As with so many other aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy, the country’s 
approach to the Black Sea region has long been dominated by its twin 
commitments to NATO (through membership), and to the EU (through 
hopes of accession). These two commitments seem to be continuously at 
odds in the way Turkey approaches its neighbours. On the one hand, 
there is the tendency to internalize European practices of economic inte-
gration and reduce conflict levels for the sake of economic benefit. On 
the other hand, at least two of Turkey’s neighbours are pitted against the 
West (Iran) or defiant to NATO (Russia). Cultivating close economic 
relations with states that are at odds with the security pact of which Tur-
key is a member (although not necessarily with Turkey itself) generates 
inherent policy problems. Although policy makers may be concerned 
about this privately, it is seldom problematized in public. In the Black 
Sea region, this means that Turkey is continuously trying to work out the 
best way to approach, or (if one prefers) balance, different power con-
stellations. Where the ‘old elite’ would rely on hard power to achieve this 
– by having a large standing army – the government that has held power 
since 2002 has increasingly sought to use softer tools in its foreign pol-
icy. As Turkey could never match Russia in hard power, focusing on soft 
power has opened a new space of political possibilities. It obviously also 
helps that Russia’s relations with NATO are now less problematic than 
before, and that Turkey’s relationship with NATO is no longer as all-
important as it used to be. 
 
At the same time, even as the prospects of EU membership seem to be 
slipping, Turkey has been working hard to make itself more attractive to 
the Union. Whether this is in the seemingly vain hope that the EU will 
change its mind, or in order to negotiate some sort of privileged partner-
ship as a substitute, is a moot point. Regardless, increased energy coop-
eration is one way of making oneself a valuable partner. Turkey pos-
sesses few energy resources itself, and will suffer from energy shortages a 
few years down the line unless it can secure new sources. Nevertheless, 
in its relations with the EU, Turkey plays up its geopolitical location, 
claiming that it possesses a unique geopolitical position as regards energy 
transit. In Turkey, this view is so commonly accepted that it has become 
entrenched in Turkish politics; it also seems to be largely accepted in 
Europe. The reasoning goes that Turkey’s geographical position ‘be-
tween East and West’ (or rather between the producers and the consum-
ers of fossil fuels) is so valuable that the question is not whether Turkey 
should move into the field of delivering energy to Europe, but how that 
                                                 
5  Written by Einar Wigen.  
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role should be developed. There seems consensus that Turkey is cur-
rently on the way to becoming an important player in the field of energy. 
As energy projects generally require huge infrastructural investments, 
tying states together in interdependent relationships, this will place Tur-
key between Azerbaijan, Iran and Iraq on the supply side and Europe on 
the demand side. That could put Turkey in a difficult squeeze if the 
Europeans were to come into conflict with one or more of these states – 
which at present does not seem entirely unlikely. The required invest-
ments will tie Turkey into such a relationship for the foreseeable future, 
and it will take some time before these investments pay off. What is sel-
dom mentioned is that this is also one of the few ways Turkey can obtain 
a steady supply of energy products, at predictable prices, for its own do-
mestic needs. 
 
Energy is an interesting field for exploring Turkey’s self-perception of its 
role both within its immediate neighbourhood and in the wider world. 
While Turkey’s material resources are limited, its geopolitical position is 
treated as if it were the key to almost every problem. Indeed, Turkish 
policy makers and the Turkish public alike seem to believe in the market-
ing of Turkey as a ‘bridge between continents’ and a ‘cradle of civiliza-
tions’. Still, given the growing insecurity about the reliability of Russian 
gas supplies to Europe, it is not unlikely that Turkey will be able to util-
ize its geographical location to serve its own interests: to integrate with 
and make itself indispensible to Europe; and to secure its own domestic 
demand for energy, with European and American companies footing the 
bill. 
 
In the following we will first offer a snapshot of the current configura-
tion of pipelines and supply. Then we present the Turkish energy dis-
course within the wider context of Turkish discourse on geopolitics, as 
well as a typology of possible energy scenarios elaborated by Turkish ex-
perts. Finally, we turn to the various pipeline projects in which Turkey is 
currently involved.  
Strategic Pipelines and Domestic Energy Security 
 
Turkey is undertaking the role of a bridge between East and West. 
Turkey is developing its geopolitical power with the current [energy 
transport] projects. We have the Nabucco gas transit project to 
Europe. This will increase Turkey’s importance (Hilmi Güler, Turkish 
Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, quoted in Socor 2009). 
 
Turkey’s role in the geopolitics of the Black Sea region is highly inter-
twined with the country’s approach to energy politics. A key aspect is the 
recurrent theme of pipeline projects to supply oil and gas to Europe. 
Turkey is trying to become a central player in the European energy sup-
ply chain even though the country actually possesses few deposits of en-
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ergy resources itself. It is rather its ‘unique geography’ that is marketed as 
Turkey’s strategic asset. Turkish politicians dealing with energy politics 
frequently refer to their country in terms of an ‘energy corridor’. How-
ever, such pipeline projects do come with certain implications attached. 
For one thing, if Turkey is to be seen as a viable partner in providing en-
ergy to Europe, it will need to downplay the pipelines’ potential as a tool 
of foreign policy. That means cooperative integration into European en-
ergy markets. At the same time, however, the field of energy policy is 
driven by some of the same actors who seek to enhance Turkey’s role as 
a regional power. There is also the inherit tension between competing 
pipeline projects, like South Stream and Nabucco, although the Turks 
seem to downplay this problem.6 
 
Currently, Turkey has five existing pipelines carrying gas or oil to or 
across its territory.7 The oil pipelines are built so that the oil ends up at 
the Mediterranean harbour of Ceyhan and can thus be exported, while 
the gas pipelines connect with the domestic grid, supplying Turkish con-
sumers. In addition, Turkey is involved in three planned pipeline pro-
jects.8 Of most interest to the Europeans are the pipeline projects that 
seek to bring Caucasian and Middle Eastern gas to European markets. 
This is also the main aspect brought to the fore when the issue is dis-
cussed by Turks in English-language media. However, a set of interviews 
conducted by this author in Istanbul in September 2010 would seem to 
indicate that, from Turkey’s point of view, the most important aspect is 
the country’s own energy security. This may be an interesting case of dis-
cursive difference between the domestic and the international level: 
Whereas Turkey’s own needs are seldom mentioned internationally, they 
are acknowledged privately (although possibly less so publicly) on the 
domestic arena. 
 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the thaw in relations be-
tween Russia and NATO made it possible for Turkey to enter into ar-
rangements that had been impossible a few years earlier. Prior to this, 
there had only been one international transit pipeline crossing Turkey – 
the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, carrying Iraqi oil for export. While this was 
a valuable contribution to the Turkish economy, it did not mean a great 
deal for domestic supply. To meet this demand, Turkey has since the 
mid-1990s pursued a strategy for connecting the Greater Caspian area to 
the Mediterranean Sea in order to act as an outlet for the landlocked 
countries of the Greater Caspian Region. The backbone of this strategy 
                                                 
6  The current hallmark of the policy of Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs is ‘integration’. 
Whatever the problem, his solution is usually ‘dialogue’ and ‘integration’. The result is that 
Turkey is simultaneously attempting to integrate with the Middle East, Russia and Europe. 
This is bound to create fissures, and certain priorities will have to be made. Energy projects 
in and around the Black Sea are a case in point. 
7  The oil pipelines are the Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan pipeline and the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline; the 
gas pipelines are the South Caucasus pipeline, Tabriz–Erzurum and Blue Stream I. 
8  These are Blue Stream II, Nabucco and South Stream. Blue Stream II is an extension of Blue 
Stream I, to bring Russian gas across Anatolia to Ceyhan for further shipping to markets 
overseas (see factbox 3). 
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has been the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, with the parallel 
pipeline carrying natural gas to Erzurum (the latter designed for domes-
tic Turkish consumption). Even though the pipeline running from Azer-
baijan to Turkey is the one most frequently mentioned in international 
research literature, it is not the most important pipeline for securing 
Turkey’s domestic demand. Russia is clearly the greatest supplier of hy-
drocarbons to Turkish markets today (Bilgin 2010a: 87).  
The Turkish Tradition of Geopolitics 
The Turkish scholar Pınar Bilgin has argued that Turkey has developed a 
particular approach to the political science discipline known as geopoli-
tics. As Bilgin argues, this was first formulated in Turkish strategic dis-
course in 1941 by Professor Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, who claimed: ‘It 
would prove vital to use the weapon of this new science against those 
who may set their eyes on our territories in the post-war period’ (quoted 
in Bilgin 2007: 742). The new foreign-policy tool came to be accepted as 
the key to Turkey’s survival and territorial integrity in the post-WWII 
era.  
 
This was later coupled with the representation of Turkey as possessing a 
unique geopolitical position, which made geopolitical truths even more 
pertinent. As Bilgin sums it up:  
 
(…) the discourses of seemingly diverse actors collude with one an-
other to produce one assumption: that Turkey’s geographical location 
is more unique that others are, and that it has more deterministic 
power over Turkey’s policies than in some other countries (ibid.: 751). 
 
It may well be that the Turkish state has been exceptionally successful in 
manufacturing consensus on this particular topic. The state does have 
access to all Turkish males when they do their stint of conscripted ser-
vice, and since the 1970s, National Security – in which the insights of the 
Turkish version of geopolitics is taught – has also been a subject that all 
Turkish secondary school students must take. The current textbook 
opens with the following paragraph: 
 
The Turkish Republic, because of its geopolitical position, has had to 
face [political] schemes devised by external powers. The Turkish youth 
needs to be prepared to deal with such schemes (quoted in Bilgin 2007: 
746). 
 
While Turkey may have developed an idiosyncratic approach to thinking 
about strategy and geography, this thinking is nevertheless based on geo-
political facts. One may disagree about the relative value of geographic 
location, but Turkey’s location is undoubtedly a potentially useful asset.  
It is noteworthy that the traditional Turkish discourse on geopolitics sees 
competition and cooperation in terms of zero-sum games – what a part-
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ner gains by cooperation is equal to what Turkey loses, and vice versa. 
Hence, if the EU gains something by Turkey’s accession, that must mean 
that Turkey loses equally. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
Ahmet Davutoğlu, is, however, frequently referred to as the architect of 
combining the discourse of ‘Turkish centrality’ with one in which coop-
eration is argued to be more than a zero-sum game. In order to realize 
what Davutoğlu sees as the potentiality of Turkey’s central position in 
the world, Turkey needs to use its ‘strategic depth’ (a metaphor much 
akin to the Russian ‘near abroad’) in order to enhance its own position 
(Bilgin 2007: 749). In this context, Turkish energy policy (and that relat-
ing to pipeline projects in particular) is deeply engrained in Turkey’s self-
understanding as a country central to world politics. Turkish analysts 
nearly always see a role for their country, no matter what transport con-
figuration is discussed. Turkish politicians will almost invariably talk 
about Turkey’s centrality to world energy supply, in particular that of 
Europe. 
 
Turkey is indispensable when it comes to addressing some of the key 
global energy problems. Turkey is also at the center of energy geopoli-
tics. (…) For a more stable and prosperous world, Turkey, as the shin-
ing star of the Near East is always aware of its great responsibility. To-
day and in the future, an option without Turkey will not suffice in solv-
ing all regional and global powers (Yıldız 2010: 16–17). 
Geopolitics and the Making of Turkish Energy Politics 
The energy field is discursively linked with this geopolitical school within 
Turkish strategic thinking. The Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural 
Resources, Taner Yıldız, is adamant that Turkey is endowed with a 
unique geographical position that makes it a valuable partner for almost 
anyone in the field of energy: 
 
As for the regional role and contributions of Turkey to the world’s en-
ergy security, it is indeed true that Turkey is geographically a bridge be-
tween Europe and Asia. However, with our diverse history, Turkey can 
also become a bridge between cultures, serving as a platform of ex-
change to better understand the people in these lands, and their sys-
tems. Therefore, it is misleading to view Turkey only as a bridge. Tur-
key is on the way to becoming a regional center between Asia and 
Europe. The center of Turkey’s energy policy is circular. And the dia-
meter of this circle is equal to the world’s diameter. Thus, Turkey’s pol-
icy on energy security directly affects global energy security (ibid.: 16). 
 
One way of summarizing this is that Turkey is the centre of the world in 
terms of energy geography, while in terms of culture, it is in a mediating 
position between two cultural centres. This way of representing Turkey 
is continuously repeated within Turkish literature on geopolitics; and, as 
energy is frequently treated through the lens of geopolitics, Turkey is 
represented as either an ‘energy hub’ or an ‘energy centre’. When Turkish 
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energy expert Mert Bilgin points out that 72% of the world’s proven hy-
drocarbon resources are located ‘in its [Turkey’s] neighborhood’ (Bilgin 
2010a: 82), that is not factually incorrect. The problem is rather that this 
vision of Turkey as the centre is taken for granted by Turkish policy 
makers and outside analysts alike, even though almost none of these re-
sources are located in Turkey itself. One way of looking at this would be 
to say that Turkey is ‘talking up’ its own value as a transit country in or-
der to gain economically from pipelines running through its territory. As 
Mert Bilgin pointed out in an interview with this author, Turkey’s main 
challenge in the energy sector is not how to exploit its geographic posi-
tion between energy suppliers and energy markets: it is how to cover its 
domestic demand for energy. Although future energy demand is difficult 
to forecast, there is wide consensus that if Turkey intends to continue its 
rapid economic growth, demand will continue to increase over the next 
15 years. According to Bilgin, Turkish energy demand will grow by 5.9% 
per year until 2025 (ibid.).  
 
Turkey’s unique geography and role as a ‘central country’ is, however, 
not merely a point of view, but an assumption that underpins the dis-
course within most security-related policy areas in Turkey. Moreover, it 
contributes to monopolizing certain policy areas for the rule of experts: 
geopolitical thinking comes with the attendant assumption that, since it 
is scientifically based, it should be left to the scientists. One main finding 
of the fieldwork carried out in connection with this report is that this 
way of thinking is of great importance to how the field of energy politics 
is treated in Turkey: it is seldom discussed in open forums, and when it 
is, intervention by government-sanctioned experts seems to narrow the 
debate down to a few acceptable positions. Moreover, most decisions are 
made not in the Turkish Parliament (Türkiye Büyük Milli Meclisi), but in 
various ministries screened from public view. What is disseminated are 
highly mediated texts, such as the Annual Report of the Ministry of En-
ergy and Natural Resources (Republic of Turkey… 2010) and the five-
year Strategic Plan (Republic of Turkey … n.d.). There are also various 
articles published in Taner Yıldız’ name in journals such as Insight Turkey 
and Turkish Policy Quarterly (see e.g. Yıldız 2010a, 2010b). 
 
Energy politics is not entirely closed off from discussion in the Turkish 
Parliament (see e.g. Türkiye Büyük Milli Meclisi 2010c: 62). However, it 
seems that the pipelines are not discussed qua energy policy, but rather as 
a side-topic to something else. There is the occasional minister bragging 
about what the government has managed to accomplish (ibid. 2010b: 
48), or the discussion of some aspect of the economy where energy is 
thrown in for good measure, but then it is rather to illustrate a broader 
point than to discuss energy in itself. The references to the Nabucco 
pipeline in the minutes of the Turkish Parliament illustrate what was also 
highlighted in the interviews: that when discussed on the home arena, it 
The Shifting Geopolitics of the Black Sea Region: Actors, Drivers and Challenges 15 
is the question of domestic energy security that gets the most attention. 
According to Muharrem Selamoğlu (MP from AKP, Niğde),  
 
Making great strides in the field of energy production in the direction 
of our country’s natural resources, we have developed and imple-
mented less expensive energy projects. We succeeded in making our 
country a key country by providing energy supply security for our own 
country and the world through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, Shah Deniz, 
the Nabucco project and the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipelines (ibid. 2010c: 
62)9 
 
Indeed, this looks rather familiar when compared with the other repre-
sentations made by the expert community and ties in nicely with the 
geopolitical strand of Turkish security policy. There is also a tendency to 
use the already accomplished pipelines as a way of arguing that Turkey is 
enjoying increased international prestige (ibid.). 
 
In connection with the signing of the agreement on the Nabucco pipe-
line project in May 2009, there seem to have been quite a few letters with 
questions posed by MPs. These are noted in the minutes of the Turkish 
Parliament, but are not widely available (see e.g. ibid. 2009a: 7; 2009b: 1, 
3, 20). There is a concern that the pipelines may be affected by the tec-
tonic fault lines on which Turkey rests. According to Hasip Kaplan (MP 
from BDP, Şırnak), 
 
I’d just like to ask: we experienced an earthquake in 1999 and the 
BOTAŞ pipeline crosses these [very same] faultlines. Now, Nabucco 
will also pass over these fault lines. But if you look at the cities which 
this pipeline passes through, there are buildings being built [sic] on top 
of it; there is a building ban 50 metres to the right and 50 metres to the 
left. So why is this happening? Does this kind of thing continue? (ibid. 
2010a) 
Turkey as Energy Corridor, Hub or Centre? 
Mert Bilgin has created a typology of three possible options for Turkish 
energy policy: energy transit corridor, energy hub, and energy centre. The 
differences relate to how Turkey profits by getting involved. 
 
Turkey as an energy transit corridor implies a variety of oil and gas 
pipelines, and other sorts of transportation, originating from Russia, 
Caspian and the Middle East not only for [the] Turkish market, but 
also for Europe and other markets via [the] Mediterranean. Turkey, in 
this scene, receives certain transit fees; however fails to put priority on 
domestic needs; is satisfied with average transit terms and conditions; 
and can not re-export [a] considerable amount of oil and gas passing 
through its lands (Bilgin 2010b). 
                                                 
9  All quotes from Turkish-language texts have been translated by this author. 
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This means that Turkey will have little role in the price-setting mecha-
nisms. It will not buy oil and gas at its eastern border and sell it at the 
point of export, pocketing the margin. Instead, it will be paid either per 
unit of product transported: in kind with gas delivered for domestic con-
sumption; or as a percentage of the selling price at the endpoint. This 
would mean that Turkey merely provides the locale for the pipeline, leav-
ing the rest to other countries, with the exception of the state oil and gas 
companies that are part of the consortium running the projects. This 
‘energy transport corridor’ model resembles how Turkey’s pipelines 
function today. Turkey is tightly bound by the regulative regime sur-
rounding the BTC and the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipelines. 
 
The second option outlined by Bilgin is that of an ‘energy hub’: 
 
Turkey as an energy hub indicates Turkey’s extensive influence on a 
web of oil and gas pipelines as well as LNG trade not only in terms of 
its ability to influence transit terms and conditions, but also to re-
export some of [the] hydrocarbons passing through this system. Com-
patibility between international agreements and [the] domestic energy 
mix is of utmost significance to avoid negative impact of one on [the] 
other and describes the level of success if Turkey appears as an energy 
hub (ibid.). 
 
The key point here is that Turkey is able to use its location as a foreign 
policy instrument also after the infrastructure has been built, and not 
merely when negotiating the initial investment or contract. This would in 
theory be a valuable resource for Turkey, but it is an open question 
whether the country would be able to employ this instrument. There may 
be other structural factors, such as existing friendships and aspirations, 
that could prevent the effective use of such a tool. 
 
The third model would give Turkey an even more extensive say in how 
the energy flows of the region will turn: 
 
Turkey as an energy center refers to a situation in which Turkey’s en-
ergy hub features have been supported by massive investments such as 
nuclear power plants, [a] renewable energy program and a comprehen-
sive infrastructure composed of additional refineries, natural gas stor-
age facilities, LNG trains, vessels, marine terminals and ports. Turkey 
as an energy center also requires her achievement of sufficient energy 
intensity and a sustainable energy mix (ibid.). 
 
That does sound like something of a Turkish pipedream. On the one 
hand, it would require a supply industry to service the infrastructure and 
to trade the energy products. On the other, it would give Turkey exten-
sive power over who in Europe and the Middle East will get their energy 
needs met. Mert Bilgin has, in an interview in September 2010 with this 
author, said that he considers it unlikely that Turkey would use such a 
set-up to pursue foreign policy goals. Rather, it is a question of profit, of 
securing domestic supply and benefiting from the related industries.  
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While this typology may offer us an interesting analysis of the differences 
between these three options, it may be more pertinent to look at what is 
read out from the possible policy routes. The analysis is silent on the 
possibility that Turkey may be irrelevant altogether, that it does in fact 
not have any of these resources itself, and that its centrality is produced 
through discourse. One may of course point out that Turkey is geo-
graphically situated where it is, but this does not explain the route taken 
by the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. The shortest route is obviously 
through Armenia, the second shortest route is through Iran – and yet, 
Georgia managed to play its cards (helped by the enmity between Azer-
baijan and Armenia and suspicions between Iran and the United States) 
so that it emerged as the transit route. Similarly, Turkey’s role as a transit 
country is not at all God-given, although it is treated as an accepted fact 
by Turkish policy makers and policy analysts. The role is hardly prob-
lematized in the media, seldom discussed in Parliament and remains to a 
large extent the privileged domain of the executive branch of govern-
ment, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
In summary, Turkey’s role in these pipeline projects is both as a recipient 
and as a transit country for natural gas from the Caspian region and Rus-
sia. With the AKP government in power, Turkey has played an increas-
ingly assertive role in its immediate neighbourhood. One may claim that 
Turkish foreign policy has been ‘Europeanized’; that instead of empha-
sizing its old reliance on a strong military to deter invasion, Turkey is 
now using economic integration and diplomatic efforts to stabilize its 
neighbourhood and relations with its neighbours.10 During the late Cold 
War period, Turkey’s energy policy was mostly confined to the Yumur-
talik–Kirkuk pipeline and the Russian gas coming from the Western 
pipeline via Bulgaria. The present government has gone much further in 
its ambitions for integrating with European energy markets. In the words 
of Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey is seeking to 
move from being an ‘appendix country’ to being a ‘centre country’ (see 
Davutoğlu 2001). Energy policy is one crucial area where Turkey has the 
potential to become a major player without finding itself at odds with the 
EU. 
Pipelines Projects: South Stream vs Nabucco 
The linchpin of Turkey’s East/West energy corridor strategy is the 
planned Nabucco gas pipeline, which is to run for 3,300 kilometres, 
from Erzurum in eastern Turkey to Baumgarten an der March in Austria, 
passing through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. As the plans currently 
stand, the pipeline is expected to be operational by 2015; it will initially 
carry 8 bcm per year, with planned maximum capacity of 31 bcm of 
natural gas per year (Freifeld 2009: 68). Such schedules are, however,  
                                                 
10  See e.g. Aydin & Acikmese (2007) or Triantaphyllou & Fotiou (2010). 
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notorious for delays. The pipeline would not only contribute to diversify-
ing the gas supply of Europe, it would also boost the capacity of the 
newly independent states around the Caspian to act independently of 
Russia. Likewise, it may offer a viable export option for Iraq. One point 
seldom touched upon is that it also provides new opportunities for Ira-
nian export: the terminal where the Nabucco pipeline is intended to start 
is also a terminal for Iranian gas, so there would be a good match be-
tween Iran’s supply and Europe’s demand11 – although this may not be 
part of the picture of the energy security that Europe is hoping for. 
 
What gave provided the impetus for Nabucco (see factbox 1) to go from 
a faint vision to a more concrete plan? The answer is found in the EU’s 
perceived need for diversification of supply. Russia is currently the main 
supplier of natural gas to the EU, and both sides are dependent on this 
relationship. The main route for getting Russian gas to the European 
market goes through Ukraine and Belarus. Between 2004 and 2009, rela-
tions between Russia and Ukraine experienced a problematic period. Gas 
quarrels between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and again in 2009 led to 
periodic stoppages in the flow of Russian gas to Europe. This induced 
Russia and the EU to search for new transit routes – and, in the case of 
the EU, to seek diversification of supply. Many plans for bringing energy 
from other sources and via new routes have been drawn up – however, 
with few concrete investments thus far. These plans include the 
Nabucco pipeline, which seeks to bring Caspian gas from Azerbaijan to 
Austria, and the competing South Stream pipeline, which aims to take 
Russian gas to Italy and Austria.  
 
                                                 
11  What is noteworthy about Iran’s new pipeline is that the country’s major gas fields are lo-
cated in the south, whereas main population centres are in the north. In consequence, for 
quite a while Iran has been liquefying and exporting gas from the south, while importing gas 
from Central Asia for consumption in the north. Tabriz, located in the north of the country, 
is, however, to be fed from Iran’s own deposits of natural gas, and the Tabriz pipeline will be 
able to deliver gas to the European and Turkish markets. 
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Factbox 1. Nabucco 
Initiated (year and partners) 2002; Turkey (BOTAŞ), Romania (Tran-
zgaz), Bulgaria (Bulgargaz), Hungary 
(MOL) and Austria (OMV); 2009 inter-
governmental agreement with EU and US 
backing. 
Annual capacity 31 bcm 
Estimated costs 7.9 billion EUR 
Other partners Germany (RWE) (2008) 
Length 4,042 kilometres 
End of project period Operational in 2015 (planned) 
Countries affected Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey (all ratified 
agreement in 2010), Hungary. 
Resource feeders Iraq, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and possi-
bly Egypt 
 
 
Turkey, along with many of the Balkan states, initially entered readily 
into Russia’s South Stream project (see factbox 2), which Russia had 
launched in order to put pressure on Ukraine. Recently, however, three 
factors have changed the game concerning South Stream. First, a more 
Russia-friendly government came to power in Ukraine in February 2010. 
Ukraine is thus no longer so antagonistic towards Russia, and it is unlike-
ly that we will see a similar deterioration in relations between the two 
countries in the near future. European energy supply via the Ukrainian 
route is therefore less likely to be disrupted. Second, the capacity of the 
pipeline running through Belarus has been increased so as to take some 
of the gas originally going via Ukraine. Third, the North Stream pipeline 
(see factbox 4), to transport gas from Russia via the Baltic Sea to Ger-
many, is now being built, and will take some of the pressure off the 
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Ukrainian route. In sum, the South Stream pipeline, which Russia was 
planning to build across the Black Sea, has now become a project less 
likely to be implemented. It is a very expensive option that would not 
make economic sense if Russia can rely on transit through Ukraine. The 
point of building it (or at least simply airing the plans) was to increase 
Russia’s leverage on Ukraine. Now that Russia no longer needs such in-
struments towards Ukraine, the South Stream project has become less 
important, and seems to have fallen off the agenda. That is not to say 
that it has necessarily been permanently scrapped. Ukraine may change 
its mind again, and turn against Russian interests, at which point South 
Stream could reappear as a possible route for circumventing Ukraine as 
an energy corridor.12 
 
Factbox 2. South Stream 
Initiated (year and partners) 2007; Russia (Gazprom), Italy (ENI) 
Annual capacity 31 to 63 bcm 
Estimated costs 25–28 billion EUR (Åslund et al. 2010) 
Other partners Austria OMV (2011) 
Length 3,300 kilometres 
End of project period Operational by 2015 (estimate) 
Countries affected Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Hungary, Italy, 
Austria, Ukraine (environmental feasibility 
plan) 
Resource feeders Russia, Turkmenistan 
Map: See factbox 1  
 
As regards Nabucco, there is a problem of supply. Despite recent dis-
coveries in Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas field, Azerbaijani reserves will 
not be sufficient to feed more than half of Nabucco’s potential full capa-
city (Bilgin 2009a: 4486). Who is to fill Nabucco? There are two main 
possibilities: Turkmenistan and Iran, with as Iran stands out as the more 
likely candidate. Whereas Turkmenistan is largely intertwined in Russia’s 
network of gas pipelines, and Russia has recently agreed on a price hike, 
Iran is currently completing a pipeline carrying gas from Tabriz to Erzu-
rum, the proposed starting point of Nabucco. Interestingly, the goal of 
diversifying European gas supply away from Russia may lead to greater 
dependence on Iran. This may cause some tension as the USA, one of 
the main sponsors of Nabucco, has been pressing for an embargo on 
Iran. Still, having two potentially unreliable suppliers is better than hav-
ing only one.  
 
The way Russia and Ukraine tried to hit at each other by manipulating 
gas transit (abruptly turning on and off the gas pipelines at critical points 
in time) can provide some interesting lessons for relations with Euro-
pean demand-side states; Turkey and the transit countries in the Balkans; 
and the supply-side states of Azerbaijan, Iran and Iraq. Just as the gas 
pipeline became a political tool for Russia in its relationship with 
                                                 
12  For an alternative view, see Geir Flikke’s section on Ukraine below. 
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Ukraine, so does the Nabucco pipeline have the potential to become a 
tool in any future conflict between these states. Since more states, with 
different types of regimes, are involved in the Nabucco pipeline, there is 
also more potential for disputes and ripple effects. The overall lesson is 
probably that infrastructural projects serve to bind states together. The 
costs of using such pipelines as tools to promote other interests in a con-
flict are enormous, and all sides have a stake in trying to keep relations 
stable. 
 
There have been some problems regarding the agreement between Tur-
key and the other partners on the Nabucco pipeline. These can be sum-
marized in three main points: 
 
- Tension between Turkey and the EU, as Turkey asked the EU 
to open the energy chapter which has remained closed due to 
the veto of Cyprus. 
- Disagreement on taxation of transit: Turkey wanted to guarantee 
the transit countries tax income calculated in terms of the dis-
tance that the pipeline passed through these countries, claiming 
that the Vienna-based Nabucco consortium would pay tax only 
to Austria. 
- The insistence of BOTAŞ13 on buying 15% of all gas in transit 
at discounted prices (Bilgin 2009b: 15). 
 
Cooperation across Former Blocs  
Although the Black Sea region is an important transit area for bringing 
oil and gas from deposits to buyers, getting gas and oil from the Caspian 
region and Central Asia to markets in Europe involves large-scale pro-
jects that carry significant political risks. The BTC oil pipeline, running 
from Baku in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan in Turkey via Tblisi in Georgia, is 
one of the politically most ambitious such projects ever completed. This 
cooperation cuts across the traditional power-blocs of the Cold War era, 
involving Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, states that do not necessarily 
trust one another (for example, both Azerbaijan and Georgia, although 
the former more than the latter, are still very exposed to Russian pres-
sure). As observed by Ole Gunnar Austvik, the distance between depos-
its and the markets for oil and gas is a perennial issue when discussing 
global politics, and its discipline geopolitics (Austvik 2009). Hydrocar-
bons are a highly prized natural resource, as they can be easily converted 
into revenues for the state. However, many of the largest deposits of oil 
and natural gas are located far from the places where they are in demand 
by industry and consumers. The main reason why the Black Sea Region 
is of such great importance to this issue is that it is located along the 
shortest route between the oil and gas deposits in the Caspian region, 
Central Asia, Iran and the Gulf, and markets in Europe. 
                                                 
13  BOTAŞ (Boru Hatları ile Petrol Taşınma A.Ş.) is a Turkish state-owned oil and gas transpor-
tation company. It has the rather peculiar slogan ‘Natural Gas is a Civilizational Project’. 
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When demand and supply are located far apart, it is vital for the states 
that need these goods and for those who supply them to ensure that 
supply lines do not fall into the hands of states or corporations that 
could disrupt transit. In recent years, the debacle between Ukraine and 
Russia has been a clear example of this. Ukraine has tried to maximize 
the revenues from transit for Central Asian and Russian gas: Russia has 
countered by turning off supply to Ukraine. However, Russia is as de-
pendent on getting its gas to the market as any other supplier, and can-
not live off its revenues unless it finds a way of bypassing Ukraine. The 
obvious choice of using shipping lines is problematic for two main rea-
sons: sea-lane congestion and limited facilities for liquefying gas for 
transport. The two straits leading out from the Black Sea, the Bosporus 
and the Dardanelles, can barely handle any more traffic than that already 
passing through them, so the actors have turned to the less flexible and 
in the short run economically much costlier option of pipelines. The 
huge financial commitments involved make the question of long-term 
stability in political cooperation between the contributing states exceed-
ingly salient. 
 
The Black Sea region is now riddled with potential projects for gas pipe-
lines which all aim to get gas from the Caspian region and Central Asia 
to European markets. The game is one of political control over these gas 
pipelines. Although some residuals of the old bloc system of the Cold 
War seem to come into play, partnerships cross-cutting this are being 
formed. Italy and Russia are collaborating on the planned Blue Stream II 
pipeline (see factbox 3), as are Russia and Turkey on the South Stream 
pipeline. In addition to the above-mentioned projects, planned or built 
by established actors in the international energy sector, a rather uncon-
ventional conglomerate has thrown itself into the competition. The ‘Per-
sian Pipeline’, which Iran is trying to build in order to transport its own 
gas to Europe, is a project which involves the National Iranian Gas Ex-
port Company (NIGEC) and the Turkish oil company SOM Petrol 
(Reuters 2010). The latter is owned by a Turkish Islamist businessman, 
reportedly a friend of the Turkish Prime Minister Reçep Tayyip Erdoğan 
(Intelligence Online 2010). According to the head of the section on eco-
nomic affairs at the Iranian Embassy in Ankara, Ahmad Noorani: ‘The 
Pars [Persian] Pipeline will go from Turkey to Greece, through Italy and 
on to other European countries’ (Press TV 2009). In July 2010, Iranian 
Oil Minister Masoud Mir Kazemi confirmed that NIGEC and SOM Pet-
rol had signed an agreement to build a pipeline across Turkey (Reuters 
2010). With a capacity of 37–40 bcm, also this pipeline is too large for 
the purposes it is intended to fill. Confronted with these facts in the 
summer of 2010, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Ta-
ner Yıldız replied: ‘As for BOTAŞ [the Turkish state-owned gas com-
pany] or the Energy Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, we have not 
signed any such agreement’ (NTVMSNBC 2010).  
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Factbox 3. Blue Stream I & II 
Initiated (year and partners) 1997 (intergovernmental agreement Russia 
and Turkey); 1999, Gazprom (Russia) and 
ENI (Italy). 
Annual capacity 16 bcm by 2010. 
Estimated costs 3.2 billion USD 
Other partners  
Length 1,213 kilometres 
End of project period Operational in 2003 
Countries affected Russia, Turkey (second phase thwarted by 
Nabucco and South Stream) 
Resource feeders Russia 
 
 
What then are Turkey’s intentions? One way to interpret the fact that 
Turkey has signed deals for three different pipelines intended to fulfil 
approximately the same function is that Turkey is hedging its bets. If the 
South Stream silently fizzles out, then Turkey will have saved face and 
not have to set priorities. However, the stakes of signing on to both of 
these competing projects are rather high. Being seen as an unreliable 
partner to the EU would undercut Turkey’s attempts to become an im-
portant part/partner of the Union.  
 
Another way of seeing this is that while the discourse on Turkey’s energy 
role is quite monolithic, the oil and gas companies are the main actors in 
the implementation of energy policy, with different companies being in-
volved in different pipeline projects. Rather than viewing Turkey as a 
unitary but ‘schizophrenic’ state, one could move the analysis one level 
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down, and argue that energy is one sector in which Turkish energy com-
panies are in competition with one another. However, in a sector where 
the commercial actors need political licensing to go ahead with their pro-
jects, this is a bit problematic. It is difficult to keep the two levels sepa-
rate in this sector. It seems unlikely that Turkey would throw in its lot 
with a largely unknown oil company owned by a friend of the Prime 
Minister, over its state-owned and more experienced companies. 
 
Summing up, four new pipeline projects (Nabucco, South Stream, Blue 
Stream II and the Persian pipeline) involving even more complex con-
glomerates of cooperation, and one exploration mission of the Black Sea 
seabed14 are being planned, all of them cross-cutting the traditional pat-
terns of cooperation and making power politics in the region seemingly 
more complex than ever before. 
Conclusions 
Turkish involvement in the Black Sea region and Turkish energy policy 
overlap mainly in the matter of pipeline politics. Yet there are some clear 
trends as to how the issue of pipelines and energy transport are framed 
in Turkey. It is taken for granted that Turkey is ‘endowed’ with a unique 
geographic setting. The question is not whether Turkey should play a role 
in the international energy game, but rather how and with whom to cooper-
ate. As the SOM Petrol case highlights, there is also a corollary to the 
question of with whom to partner up – that of who inside Turkey are privi-
leged to engage in such a politically and strategically important infrastruc-
ture project as a major pipeline. SOM Petrol, though it may be well con-
nected, is not seen as a sufficiently secure and reliable partner for such a 
project.  
 
In Turkish politics, topics that become an issue of contention often po-
larize the country and evoke strong feelings. Energy is not such a topic, 
however. It is kept away from the parliamentary arena and whenever it 
hits the newspapers, it is mostly in the matter-of-fact manner characteris-
tic of topics where there is broad national consensus. That most Turkish 
observers do not make a point out of the fact that Turkey has thrown its 
lot in with two incompatible projects, South Stream and Nabucco, is also 
indicative of this consensus. If the idea that Turkey is a country central to the 
transportation of energy is already taken for granted in a country that pos-
sesses almost no such resources itself, Turkey needs to mitigate the pos-
sibility that a pipeline may simply bypass it, thereby negating this truism. 
Given this consensus in Turkish politics and the fact that Turkey is part-
nering up with nearly all the pipeline projects in the region, there seems 
little doubt of success. 
                                                 
14  In May 2010, Turkey and Brazil signed an agreement for exploring oil and gas on the seabed 
of the Black Sea. However, this seems to have limited potential. 
Ukraine: A Strategic Backdrop15 
Like Turkey, Ukraine is an important player in the energy politics in the 
Black Sea region. Its role in the energy configuration is strategic in two 
senses. First, Ukraine is a major transit country for gas to European 
markets: 80% of all the gas that Russia exports to the EU passes through 
the Ukrainian gas transportation system (Mankoff 2009), which consists 
of 37,500 kilometres of pipelines and 13 underground storage facilities. 
The total annual amount of gas received by EU countries through this 
network is 110–120 bcm,16 while Ukraine itself consumes from 60 to 75 
bcm annually (Elkind 2010: 133; Chow & Elkind 2009: 78, 81). This 
pipeline infrastructure is thus crucial to European energy security; reve-
nues from gas transit also play an important role in the domestic econo-
mies of Ukraine as well as Russia.17 Second, Ukraine’s role as a littoral 
state, bordering on the Black Sea, makes Ukraine a stakeholder in exist-
ing and potential transport routes for hydrocarbons across the Black 
Sea.18 There are also potential oil and gas deposits on the Ukrainian shelf 
that may be exploited.19 Indeed, in the squeeze between the EU on the 
one hand, and Russia on the other, the Black Sea region has been con-
sidered by many as the arena on which Ukraine could make a visible and 
counting impact. 
 
Ukraine’s importance in energy transit is fraught with dilemmas, how-
ever. Like Turkey, Ukraine is not self-sufficient in energy. In 2009, 
Ukraine met only 25% of the domestic oil consumption and 30% of the 
gas consumption through its own production, and depended on Russia 
to cover the rest (Razumkov Centre 2009: 4). As of 2010, Ukraine de-
pends on Russia for 75–80% of the natural gas and 85–90% of the oil 
consumed, and the prospects for increasing domestic production of oil 
and gas remain slim. Indeed, energy deficiency is a major problem, as 
Ukraine is currently able to cover only 47–49% of its energy needs (ICPS 
2010a: 21).20 This has made Ukraine vulnerable to Russian influence, and 
                                                 
15  Written by Geir Flikke. 
16  Estimates vary as to Russia’s total share of EU energy imports. In 2006, Russia’s share was 
estimated to be 33% of crude oil and 42% of natural gas (Whist 2008). Anders Åslund esti-
mates that Gazprom alone stands for 40% of the EU’s gas import and 25% of its total energy 
supply, but suggests that this will decline (Åslund et al. 2010: 160). See also Gira (2010).  
17  The gas transited through Ukraine accounts for less than 25% of Russia’s production, but 
two thirds of Gazprom’s revenues, according to Chow & Elkind (2009: 78). 
18  Unlike Turkey, however, Ukraine is not an important military player in the Black Sea region. 
For an account of Turkey as the most significant maritime power in the Black Sea, see Sand-
ers (2010: 110–11). 
19  In January 2010, the Ukrainian government issued a permit to Naftogaz to conduct geologi-
cal surveys of the Pallas field in the northeast section of the Black Sea. The field is expected 
to contain 157 bcm of gas (Rudnitskiy 2010). Other sources claim 75 bcm of natural gas and 
490 million metric tons of oil (RIA Novosti 2010). 
20  As Anders Åslund contends, Ukrainian economy is highly energy-intensive and consumes 
much energy (Åslund et al. 2010: 165). Chow and Elkind (2010: 81) indicate that Ukraine is 
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also inscribed Ukraine in increasingly complex relations involving the 
EU, NATO and Russia. Moreover, transit issues have a direct effect on 
domestic policies.21 The two gas cut-offs in 2006 and 2009, motivated by 
controversies over prices and transit, exposed Ukraine to tough political 
turmoil and economic hardships. Adding to this, Ukraine’s political tran-
sition after the Orange Revolution was vulnerable to external influences, 
especially due to the East/West divisions within the elite.  
 
This part of the report highlights Ukraine’s transit conundrum and bal-
ancing behaviour. Having since 2005 aspired to both NATO and EU 
membership, Ukraine in 2010 shelved its aspirations to NATO member-
ship, but still argues that it has a ‘clear right to become an EU member if 
it qualifies’ (Grishchenko 2010). This position is combined with a more 
accommodating Russia-policy. Ukraine sees energy transit as a means to 
enhance its significance for the EU, while at the same time seeking to 
repair relations with Russia. Still, its Russia-policy in many ways enhances 
the dilemmas rather than solving them. Ukraine’s domestic arena pro-
vides an ambivalent display of Russia’s importance.22 Moreover, the new 
pricing mechanism for gas binds Ukraine in with several issues, such as 
Black Sea security and energy politics. In this sense, Ukraine displays 
some of the characteristics of ‘shifting geopolitics’ referred to above – 
and increasingly so since 2010.  
Geopolitics and Ukraine’s Energy Conundrum 
Unlike Turkey, Ukraine does not seem to have made geopolitics a major 
field of study for aspiring professionals. Still, the matter seems to haunt 
the Ukrainian polity. When the term ‘geopolitics’ is used as a description 
of Ukraine’s strategic realities, it is mostly in two contexts: energy, and 
linguistic divides. The first involves transit issues; the second, politics 
and political identities. In the energy conundrum, the two come together 
in a peculiar fashion. Energy transit is a factor that boosts Ukraine’s im-
portance, while the country’s political identity serves as a major impedi-
ment to its modernization. Hence, to the degree that factors combining 
territory and national identity exist, Ukrainian researchers have referred 
to Ukraine as a ‘dual periphery’ situated at the cross-roads of Europe and 
Eurasia (Perepelytsia 2009: 106–07). While various versions of Ukraine 
as a divided society have been cultivated at different stages of Ukraine’s 
history, the argument has not manifested itself in any clear assertive or 
forward-leaning geopolitical posture. Rather, it is the vulnerability of 
                                                 
the sixth largest gas consumer globally and that it consumes more than the Visegrad 4 (Po-
land, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) put together. 
21  Robert Legvold and Celeste Wallander (2004) have discussed the political effect of a gas cut-
offs on a transit country. They suggest that the fact that Russia can sustain the costs of a cut-
off longer than Ukraine accounts for its notable political influence.  
22  Domestic policies often take circuitous routes that reach back to a deep-rooted domestic 
policy stand-off over constitutional reforms. In the course of 2010, several important institu-
tional gains from the Orange Revolution were reversed (Flikke 2011) 
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Ukraine to inherent and surrounding civilizational divides that is the key 
point. The prestigious Annual Strategic Review of Ukraine thus states: 
 
[Ukraine’s] intercivilizational position as a frontier country has be-
come more complicated. Ukraine found itself in an unstable and un-
certain civilizational situation. It can be viewed simultaneously as a pe-
riphery of the West, i.e. of the Western civilization, and as a periphery 
of the Eastern civilization, i.e. Eurasia. This dual periphery generates 
challenges faced by any periphery country. Attempts to integrate into 
either civilization evoke strong resistance of the other civilizational 
community. Peripheral conditions doom the country to economic 
backwardness and political instability (Perepelytsia 2009: 106–7). 
 
If anything, the political stand-offs after the Orange Revolution have 
illustrated Ukraine’s ambivalent posture in foreign and security politics, 
but have not changed the strategic vulnerability of the country. In fact, 
Ukraine has been considered central to Europe and the European civili-
zation in more than one sense, but certainly more so as an energy transit 
country. Since 2005, Ukraine has become increasingly aware of the ‘stra-
tegic energy triangle’ involving the EU, Russia and Ukraine, and that 
Ukraine is ‘decisive for European energy security’ (Razumkov Centre 
2009). In 2008, the Annual Strategic Review of Ukraine stressed that 
‘Ukraine is an important link in providing the European consumer mar-
ket with fuel and energy resources’, adding to this the assertion that 
Ukraine with its strategic location as a transit country ‘takes all required 
measures to aimed at integration in the European energy community’ 
(Perepelytsia 2009: 5–6).23 Other analyses have looked more to the in-
herent ‘civilizational’ conundrum, and opted for a ‘balancing act’ policy, 
suggesting that ‘Ukraine, as an energy bridge between the EU and Rus-
sia, should not cause conflicts between them, but conciliate and take into 
the interest of all parties’ (Razumkov Centre 2009: 9).  
 
To solve the energy conundrum and prepare for a coherent energy strat-
egy, an Energy Strategy of Ukraine was adopted in 2006. Since the adoption 
of this strategy, Ukraine has sought not only diversification of transit 
sources, but also alternative sources of energy. The aim was to diversify 
external energy supplies from three main sources – oil, gas and nuclear 
energy – each representing about 25–30% of the total volume (Razum-
kov Centre 2009: 8). However, this strategy has been backed up by clear 
procedures for adopting energy legislation; according to some estimates, 
‘the country has no set of effective, interrelated and strategic documents 
in the energy sector’ (ICPS: 2010a: 5). Moreover, a main challenge for 
Ukraine as a transit country is the poor state of the pipeline system, and 
what has been termed the ‘investment hunger’ in the energy sector. The 
                                                 
23  In this strategic review, analysts also emphasized the importance of bilateral relations with 
the USA and Poland first and foremost. The EU follow-up on a Free Trade Agreement with 
Ukraine after Ukraine’s WTO membership in 2008, and the negotiations on the Energy 
Community starting in 2008 were also seen by Ukrainian analysts as being of primary impor-
tance. See Perepelytsia (2009: 91–92).  
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full capacity of the pipeline system was to be 141 bcm annually, but in 
2009, according to Ukrainian estimates, only 75 bcm passed through 
Ukraine, due mainly to the poor state of the system and the supply 
crunch in Russia. Modernization of the 40-year-old system has now be-
come mandatory, and Russia has recently embarked on a forward-leaning 
and proactive policy in this domain (Grib & Gavrish 2010a).  
 
It has not been easy to overcome the structural limitations that domestic 
consumption, energy deficiency and transit issues emplace on foreign 
policies. Ukraine’s policy on gas prices and relations to Russia has vacil-
lated between a policy of confrontation, arguing that Russia has priced 
gas too high, using the debt as a means to limit Ukraine’s sovereignty, 
and one of temporary accommodation and agreements. This is due not 
least to Ukraine’s dependence on Russia’s hydrocarbon resources to 
cover domestic demand – a dependence that does not seem to decline, 
and a fact that makes any attempt to balance the interests of demanders 
and suppliers more difficult.  
 
Russia’s pricing policies undoubtedly play an important role in shaping 
the Ukrainian energy sector. In May 2009, the debt accumulated by the 
Ukrainian state energy company Naftogaz exceeded 4.4 billion USD. Of 
this, 2.2 billion USD were urgently needed to pay overdue credits (Ra-
zumkov Centre 2009: 8, 19). To be sure, in the aftermath of the 2008 
global economic crisis, Russia carried costs as well. Ukraine is a major 
gas market for Russia, and Russia’s insistence on being a global energy 
actor obscures the fact that the CIS region remains the most important 
market for Russian hydrocarbons. Moreover, in 2009, Gazprom experi-
enced a decline in EU demand for gas, as well as the heavy costs of long-
term and fixed-price contracts (Åslund et al. 2010: 162). The collapse of 
the SATs pipeline bringing gas from Turkmenistan to Russia in April 
2009 added to the problems. Russia lost the Turkmens to China; and 
given Russia’s dependence on cheap Turkmenistani gas, this impacted on 
the economy as well.  
 
Nevertheless, while Ukraine sees the transit of gas to European markets 
as being a foreign policy asset, it also has the potential for huge impacts 
on the national economy. This will remain so also in the future: The al-
ready-dire need for investments in the pipeline infrastructure will in-
crease, and Ukraine’s domestic capacity for production is decreasing 
(ICPS 2010a). The Lithuanian analyst Sirijos Gira is correct in saying that 
the ‘aspirations of the Ukrainian government to review energy relations 
with Russia may be explained by the wish to obtain additional leverage in 
the negotiation process on modernization and privatization issues of the 
Ukrainian natural gas transportation system’ (Gira 2010) – and subse-
quently with the EU as well. In Ukraine, ‘Europeanization’ currently 
means energy policies, first and foremost: Ukraine wants any relationship 
to the EU to be ‘special’ – that is, adapted to the domestic and economic 
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realities of Ukraine – but Ukraine cannot simply leave the realpolitik of 
the gas transit. A Razumkov study has concluded that ‘the EU and Rus-
sia – in the chase for diversification of ways [transport routes] and 
sources of gas delivery sometimes neglect economic principles’ (Razum-
kov Centre 2009: 24). This is an understatement, and reflects two things: 
the reliance of Ukraine on energy transit; and the apprehension that 
other transport routes may challenge its transit importance. The net re-
sult is politics.  
The EU: Between ENP and Energy  
EU policies with Ukraine are designed to fit with what has been called 
‘compensatory regionalism’ (Emerson 2008).24 The European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a primary tool in this approach. It sets 
‘accession Europeanization’ demands, without offering the incentive of 
membership (Wolczuk 2009). The ENP is about making neighbours 
‘European’: on the one hand it is characterized by strict conditionality in 
a ‘top–down’ approach to the recipient country, and on the other, by a 
‘conditionality lite’ as it offers only a loose framework for ‘Europeaniza-
tion’ (Franke et al. 2010: 149–50).25 This said, the bilateral format of the 
ENP is designed to address country-specific issues, taking into account 
the huge regional differences. For Ukraine, the prospects of an associa-
tion agreement or membership have overshadowed any other incentive 
offered by regional cooperation. This stems partly from the fact that 
there are numerous regional initiatives, including the Visegrad 4, the 
Eastern Partnership, and the Black Sea Synergy. For Ukraine, it is some-
times hard to conceptualize what ‘regional cooperation’ means if mem-
bership is not an option. Moreover, for regionalism to matter, the vari-
ous regional initiatives will have to be more effective – but then again, 
Ukraine has not positioned itself unambiguously in any of these.  
 
Although the incentives are weaker than if full membership were on the 
agenda, the ENP apparently has an effect, not least in combination with 
other tools. According to the theory of ‘institutional entrapment’, the EU 
can create conditions for integration by developing a critical mass of in-
stitutional links with Ukraine. The idea is to create institutional levels 
that promote transformation, secure convergence and create a critical 
mass that raises the cost of opting out of the integration – or neighbour-
hood process.26 This entrapment works two ways, however. As Flem-
ming Splidsboel-Hansen contends, there are also dangers of ‘reverse rhe-
                                                 
24  Emerson contrasts this with ‘transformative regionalism’ and ‘geopolitical regionalism’, 
where the former alludes to ‘accession Europeanization’, and the latter to a status-quo inter-
est policy. Given the nature of the EU, several understandings of regionalism may apply. 
25  Gwendolyn Sasse (2008: 296) argues the converse, suggesting that conditionality criteria are 
more ‘vague for both the EU and the ENP countries’, indicating that conditionality is 
stronger for the EU on the Balkans.  
26  Institutional entrapment cuts across several levels of political life, bureaucracy and civil soci-
ety in Ukraine. Discourse on association and ‘Europeanization’ are launched at several levels. 
Ukraine has about 650 officials dealing with the EU at various levels (Solonenko 2010). 
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torical entrapment’, where ‘ideational reasons may compel the EU to of-
fer much more than it would otherwise have done’ (Hansen 2006). The 
idea of a Europe that is open to all may create expectations within the 
elite that they can seek legitimacy for their policies by appealing to ‘Euro-
peanization’.27 In this sense, much of what the EU considers to be the 
transformational effect of its ENP would depend on Ukraine’s ability to 
absorb EU reform demands, and also Ukraine’s regional posture.  
 
As a transformative actor, the EU has focused primarily on governance 
and convergence with EU policies. In the energy sector, the EU has re-
lied mainly on institutional incentives. Ukraine has ratified the EU En-
ergy Charter (1998), but not the transit protocol regulating relations be-
tween producers, consumers and transporters. From 2005 until 2009, the 
EU offered few specific new incentives, conducting generally regular 
high-level summits, focusing on the internal political reforms of Ukraine, 
a core issue for the EU during this period. For instance, at the 12th EU–
Ukraine Cooperation Council meeting in 2008, the final statement ad-
dressed political stability and constitutional reforms (Gliére 2009: 89). 
The EU did sign a MoU with Ukraine on energy in 2005, benchmarking 
policies for Ukraine to pursue in order to become energy-efficient (Fe-
dorchenko 2010); and in 2009, it embarked on an agreement to modern-
ize the gas transit system of Ukraine conditional on the Ukrainian side 
providing state guarantees for funding. As of December 2009, Ukraine 
also became a member of the European Energy Community, originally a 
tool for expanding the EU energy market to southeastern Europe.28  
 
Energy and internal transformation remain critical focal points for the 
EU also in a larger regional context. As argued by Latvian analysts Toms 
Rostoks and Andris Spruds, the EU can have an impact on regional en-
ergy cooperation, both in terms of financial means (mainly investments 
in the infrastructure of new members) and as a multilateral arena for dis-
cussions on energy deliveries (to overcome ‘energy unilateralism’) 
(Spruds & Rostoks 2009). The former could be related to the neighbour-
hood policies, or pledges to invest in transit systems, while the latter re-
lates to a distinct ‘arena effect’ on external surroundings, involving the 
implementation of norms. In both instances, bilateralism would be prob-
lematic.  
 
Even in this context, Ukraine has been considered a ‘test case’ for the 
transformational power of the EU, and partly also as an important front-
runner in Europeanization (Solonenko 2010; Franke et al. 2010). The 
                                                 
27  For example, while the EU may use multiple levels to create structures that make it costly for 
elites to abandon conditionality and Europeanization, it cannot guard itself against a reverse 
conditionality, or rhetorical entrapments that suggest the need for quick association agree-
ments. Hence, when Ukrainian Prime Minister Tymoshenko in the autumn of 2009 stated 
that it was necessary to sign an association agreement with the EU before the presidential 
election, she was inviting the EU to take a political stand (Sidorenko 2009).  
28  The European Energy Community is open to third members and observers. Current observ-
ers are Georgia, Norway and Turkey.  
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effect of the ‘energy unilateralism’ disruptions in 2006 and again in 2009 
was instrumental in prompting the EU in March 2009 to pledge a 2.5–
3.5 billion USD loan to modernize Ukraine’s pipeline system, while si-
multaneously launching the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The loan would 
be given by the World Bank and the EBRD, pending transparent hand-
ling of transit issues and EU access to pipelines and underground stor-
ages in cases of gas disruption. Russia reacted promptly, condemning the 
deal for leaving Russia ‘out’, which again illustrated Ukrainian vulner-
abilities.  
 
Ukraine has sought to get Russia to focus its concerns on NATO mem-
bership, not on the prospect of EU integration. Ever since declaring in 
2006 that Ukraine would not need a membership action plan (MAP) 
from NATO, now President Viktor Yanukovich has, at least at the rhe-
torical level, preferred tighter association with the EU. To substantiate 
this, Yanukovich immediately after his presidential inauguration in 
March 2010 travelled to Brussels to get the EU to implement a new visa-
free regime starting from January 2011.29 In an attempt to add increased 
credibility to its policy, the Ukrainian government also submitted a draft 
law to the Rada on ‘Applying for membership in the European Union’, 
which included a presidential mandate to establish a commission prepar-
ing for rapid accession to the EU (Sviridenko 2010). 
 
Still, Ukraine’s official shelving of future NATO membership in June 
2010 has dismantled the logic of Euro-Atlantic integration pursued by 
the outgoing Yushchenko administration (parallel EU and NATO pro-
cesses). According to the foreign-policy outline of the new government, 
Ukraine is to pursue a policy of ‘strategic balancing’ and ‘transparent 
neutrality’ that rules out NATO membership. At the same time it opens 
up for Russian leasing of naval facilities for its Black Sea Fleet up to the 
year 2042 (see below for details). In the current government’s perspec-
tive, such a policy implies ‘Europeanization’ without harming relations 
with Russia, as well as making the most of Ukraine’s strategic assets, in-
cluding gas transit, all in the name of economic modernization 
(Grishchenko 2010). This may, however, very well imply an example of 
reverse rhetorical entrapment. The Ukrainian government has from time 
to time tried to make the most of what it refers to as ‘EU promises’, but 
without referring to the conditions set by the EU. In July 2010, Ukrain-
ian foreign minister Konstantyn Grishchenko indicated that the EU 
could not back down from its commitments to Ukraine. Claiming that 
Ukraine as a European democracy had an ‘absolute right’ to become a 
member of the European Union, Grishchenko lamented that the EU 
stood in danger of becoming ‘a democratic ghetto, separated from the 
rest of the continent’ (ibid.).30  
                                                 
29  This visit was partially in response to the European Parliament’s adoption of a resolution in 
February calling for a ‘road map’ for a visa-free regime with Ukraine. 
30  The Party of Regions has also sought recognition from the European Parliament, seeking a 
membership in the club of social democrats. 
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Ukraine gets no free ride from the EU, however. As mentioned above, 
the EU’s commitment from 2009 to invest in the pipeline system and 
secure transit is tied to Ukraine’s own contribution with state guarantees. 
As regards the prospects of visa-free travel, despite Yanukovich’s at-
tempts in March 2010 to reassure the Commission that Ukraine would 
‘continue its path towards European integration’ (Sidorenko 2010b), the 
EU did not drop its demands that Ukraine should establish a new gov-
ernment body dealing with migration and should undertake the reform 
of the system of assigning international passports. In addition, all EU 
members would have to ratify a treaty with Ukraine individually (Si-
dorenko & Kalnysh 2010). In a parallel process, the EU cut the ENP 
funding to Ukraine by 24 million EUR, earmarking the remainder (total-
ling 470 million EUR) for economic and legal reforms (90–140 million 
EUR), sustainable development (211–258 million EUR), plus the imple-
mentation of acquis communautaire norms (117–164 million EUR) 
(Panchenko 2010). Similar indications of caution were given in April 
2010 with the circulation of a non-paper called the ‘Matrix’, an informal 
way of communicating the EU benchmarks for Ukraine, but without the 
high-level clout attached to the regular summit declarations (Solonenko 
2010; Sidorenko 2010c). The Matrix did contain a road-map drawing up 
short-term, medium-term and long-term goals, including listing a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) as a new long-term goal. Finally, as a result of 
its accession to the European Energy Community, Ukraine has to make 
investments of 8–15 billion EUR in order to implement the EU direc-
tives on environmental standards and energy efficiency (ICSP 2010b). 
The Kharkov Agreement: Russia Goes Downstream  
While EU–Ukraine relations were characterized by mutual caution 
throughout 2010, Russian–Ukrainian relations revitalized substantially 
over the same period. This is mostly due to Russia’s rapid reactivation of 
relations after the presidential elections, especially in the energy sector. 
For Ukraine, the strategic outlook has remained relatively constant – one 
of asymmetric dependence on Russian energy transit to the EU. Accord-
ing to the Annual Strategic Review, ‘Ukraine’s energy security included [in 
2008] the same unresolved problems that emerged back in 1991 – the 
need for reducing energy dependence on the external monopolist sup-
plier, and enhancing energy efficiency in the national economy’ (Hon-
char 2009: 127). Still, the ‘civilizational factor’ has had an imprint in the 
sense that those of Ukraine’s political elite currently in power have ap-
pealed to Russia to solve its modernization issues and mounting budget 
deficits in the wake of the 2008 crisis. 
 
In 2010, this set adrift what James Sherr has termed the ‘mortgaging of 
Ukraine’s independence’ (Sherr 2010b). At first, this involved an appeal 
to both the EU and Russia. Prior to the elections, Yanukovich proposed 
to form an international consortium for modernizing Ukraine’s pipeline 
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system. Shares would go to the EU, Ukraine and Russia, and would be 
made conditional on lower domestic gas prices for Ukraine. The foreign-
policy vision attached to this was that Ukraine should be central focus of 
the consumer interests of the EU and the energy companies of Russia 
and Central Asia, with a capacity increase of 200 bcm per year (Grib & 
Gavrish 2010a). After taking office, President Yanukovich tried to ad-
dress energy issues and foreign policy within a framework if not for 
European integration, then at least for a common European vision of 
Ukraine’s importance in transit questions.  
 
The attempt to enhance the significance of Ukraine as a transit country 
dwindled with the impact of the economic crisis, however. Ukraine could 
not ‘pull Russia in through the pipeline’, as Kommersant indicated (ibid.), 
without incurring substantial political costs. The impacts of the 2008 cri-
sis were deep. Ukraine’s foreign currency reserves had been reduced 
from 22 billion EUR in 2007 to 17 billion EUR by 2010. The currency 
had depreciated by 60%, and the budget balance worsened from a 1% 
deficit in 2007 to a 10% deficit by 2010. Most importantly, foreign debt 
as estimated in percentage of GDP was 55–60% in 2007–08, but in-
creased to 90% in 2009 (UNIFIN 2010). In March 2010, the government 
woke up to a budget deficit that was higher than the 6% threshold intro-
duced by the IMF, thus preventing the release of a 15.8 billion USD 
stand-by loan.  
 
Identifying energy costs as a source of the fiscal crisis, the government 
set out both to negotiate lower gas prices and to reclaim control over the 
national energy company Naftogaz.31 Originally, the scheme included the 
Azarov government’s ambition of securing a reduction of the gas price 
from 305 USD per 1000 cubic metres to the same level as Belarus paid, 
that is 168 USD per 1000 cubic metres, in exchange for the establish-
ment of a gas transport consortium (Gavrish & Grib 2010a), but also 
against a raise in the leasing fees for the Black Sea fleet.32 Gazprom was 
playing hard to get, however, signalling that gas prices would remain at 
the former level (Rudnitskiy 2010). Also the idea of a joint gas-transport 
consortium was downplayed by Gazprom, which argued that it would be 
interested only if it could receive a controlling package in Uktransgaz. 
This demand was repeated during a meeting with Putin and Azarov, 
when Gazprom representatives argued that the gas market had changed, 
                                                 
31  Two former employees of the Firtash-controlled Ostchem Holding were promoted as direc-
tors of the departments on gas exploitation (Ukrgazdobycha) and gas transit (Ukrtransgaz). 
Moreover, the government was preparing to regain a majority stake in Ukrtatnaft (Gavrish & 
Ledenev 2010). Kommersant warned against the tendency of the prime minister to involve the 
state in all branches of the economy (Gavrish et al. 2010a).  
32  Before the election, President Viktor Yushchenko had asked the Constitutional Court to rule 
on whether an addendum added in 1997 to allow for leasing of the Black Sea naval base was 
in conflict with paragraph 17 of the Constitution, which prohibits permanent foreign military 
bases in Ukraine. Yushchenko argued that paragraph 14 should be seen as a preliminary regu-
latory act with a specific time-limit, and also that parliamentary debates on the paragraph dat-
ing back to 1996 justified a termination of the leasing by 2017, or even before (2012 was pro-
posed). The attempt failed, partially because that the members of the Constitutional Court 
saw no possibility of reaching a conclusion on the time-limit of this clause (Sidorenko 2010a).  
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that Russia now exported more to the global market and was thus less 
interested in regional solutions (Grib et al. 2010a).33 Clearly, the Ukraini-
ans did not have a strong hand. The gas price formula of 2009 was al-
ready putting Ukraine’s economy under pressure.34 Hence, the first 
summit between Yanukovich and Medvedev, which had been planned 
for 17–18 May 2010, was moved to 21 April (Grib & Gavrish 2010b). 
The reason for moving up the summit was, according to Kommersant, that 
the government needed to ‘quickly adopt the budget, which depends on 
Russian gas prices’ (ibid.). The government was in other words placing 
the adoption of the budget at Russia’s will.  
 
Russia effectively exploited this. The Kharkov Agreement of April 2010 
introduced a mechanism for swapping future leasing fees for the naval 
facilities in Crimea against Ukraine’s accumulated debt. Moreover, the 
agreement stipulated that gas sold at a price lower than 333.33 USD per 
1000 cubic metres was to be exempt from custom fees. Gas sold at 
higher prices would incur a fee equal to the difference between 30% of 
the price and 100 USD per 1000 cubic metres. This implies that Ukraine 
will save about 40 billion USD over a ten-year period, which is substan-
tially more than what has been offered by the EU (2.5–3.5 billion USD 
for pipeline modernization) and the IMF (15.8 billion USD in a struc-
tural reform stand-by loan). Russia, on the other hand, is to maintain 
control over the naval base in Crimea for a longer period than originally 
foreseen in the Agreement of Friendship (the lease is extended from 
2017 to 2042). In sum, the Kharkov Agreement thus strengthened Rus-
sia’s footing in the region and put Ukraine in a tight spot also in the set-
ting of Black Sea cooperative arrangements. 
Pipeline Politics: The Black Sea Region 
This report has situated ‘geopolitics’ in the nexus between volatile align-
ments and imperfect energy markets. The EU’s effect on this arena is 
limited to incentives for modernization and ‘Europeanization’. In accor-
dance with this, the EU in March 2009, as mentioned above, signed an 
agreement with Ukraine stipulating massive investment in return for a 
liberalization of the internal gas market in Ukraine, undisrupted gas de-
liverances, access to pipelines in the event of irregular deliveries, and ac-
cess to underground storage facilities by third parties (Gavrish 2010a).35  
 
Clearly, the EU is also seeking to enhance its energy security through 
diversification. The Nabucco project plays an important role here, not 
                                                 
33  This is not the case. As shown by Anders Åslund, most of Russia’s energy export goes to the 
CIS region (Åslund et al. 2010).  
34  The 2009 agreement included a price formula which stipulated a 25 USD rise every third 
month, reaching a maximum price of 390 USD per 1000 cubic metres in 2010. See Sherr 
(2010b).  
35  Ukraine signed another memorandum with the EU in October 2009, obliging Ukraine to 
adapt to the norms of the EU Energy Charter by 2012. This will involves full liberalization of 
the internal energy market in Ukraine. 
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least since there are serious concerns that the Russia-promoted South 
Stream project is not economically viable.36 This cost-calculus notwith-
standing, Russian success in Kharkov emboldened Russia and Gazprom. 
On 30 April 2010 Putin proposed that Gazprom and Naftogaz should 
merge into one company controlling the pipeline system. This would 
also entail lowering the internal gas prices in Ukraine to the level on the 
domestic market in Russia. Yanukovich did not take part in this meeting, 
and argued that if he had been present, he would have proposed a 50–50 
solution (Gavrish & Grib 2010b). Absent or not, in May 2010, the 
Ukrainian government started talks with Russian counterparts on merg-
ing Naftogaz and Gazprom. The value of Naftogaz was about 8% of the 
total value of Gazprom, but Ukraine was reluctant to see Naftogaz ‘ab-
sorbed into Gazprom’, as government sources put it (ibid.). Moreover, 
the Ukrainian government did not want to lose control over the pipeline 
system. In addition, a merger of the two companies would have reper-
cussions for the Ukrainian economy, since Naftogaz, according to some 
estimates, was generating about 9% of the total Ukrainian budget reve-
nues (ibid.). 
 
Russia reciprocated through Gazprom, and employed South Stream (see 
factbox 2) as leverage on the merger talks. Russian government officials 
argued that the gas infrastructure in Ukraine was an asset only insofar as 
there was gas in it, and that South Stream would make the Ukrainian in-
frastructure less valuable for Russia (ibid.). Ukraine did not accept this, 
and argued that a merger should entail Ukraine retaining national control 
over the company. Russia countered by claiming that a merger between 
Gazprom and Naftogaz would give Ukraine access to Russian gas fields 
and that the creation of a vertically integrated company structure would 
increase the security of supply in Ukraine (Gavrish & Grib 2010c). 
Ukraine responded by inviting Russia into the Black Sea, suggesting that 
a joint venture could be created for offshore oil extraction in the Ukrain-
ian EEZ (Gavrish et al. 2010b). This was reiterated at the Black Sea Fo-
rum in June, where Yanukovich proposed a ‘swap’ deal and to merge the 
companies in a way that would give Russia access to the Pallas field in 
the Black Sea, and Ukraine access to oil and gas fields in Russia.37  
 
Again, the response from Gazprom was cool. The company argued that 
it would prefer to purchase a controlling stake, as it had done in Belarus, 
where Gazprom paid 2.5 billion USD for a controlling stake in Beltrans-
gaz. Russia also reactivated its lobbying for South Stream vis-à-vis Tur-
key. While presenting survey data on the proposed route of South 
Stream, Putin suggested the formation of a Turkish–Russian energy alli-
                                                 
36  See Einar Wigen’s argument above. There are also obstacles to the realization of the 
Nabucco pipeline, however: Both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have pledged to deliver 30 
bcm to Nabucco, but Turkmenistan lacks a pipeline system for transporting gas across the 
Caspian Sea. 
37  This idea was based on the German experience with asset swaps and joint ventures between 
Wintershall and Gazprom (ibid.) 
Geir Flikke (ed.), Einar Wigen, Helge Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø 36 
ance (Grib & Gavrish 2010c). Russian representatives underlined the 
geostrategic considerations of this alliance, by indicating that any support 
to the Samsun–Ceyhan oil pipeline would depend on the Turkish re-
sponse to South Stream. This created apprehension in the Ukrainian 
camp, and Ukraine proposed to increase the flow of gas through the ex-
isting pipeline system providing gas to the Balkans from 40 bcm annually 
to 60 bcm (ibid.). The estimated costs of improving this existing pipeline 
would be 4–5 billion USD, against the 26 billion USD cost of South 
Stream, the Ministry of Energy argued (ibid.). Ukraine also started talking 
about a strategic Turkish–Ukrainian partnership at the level of presiden-
tial administrations (Sidorenko 2010e). Moreover it was rumoured that 
that the Ukrainian–Russian honeymoon was over, and that Ukraine 
would step up its attempts to thwart South Stream (ibid.). Russia made a 
new move in July 2010, hinting that it might invite German RWE to take 
part in South Stream. Such an invitation would undermine Nabucco, 
where the RWE has been a primary engine in negotiating gas deliveries 
to feed into the proposed pipeline (Grib et al. 2010b).  
 
These twists and turns in Ukraine’s relations with Russia illustrate a cru-
cial point: in the geopolitics of energy, the Russian South Stream project 
has always been a challenge to Ukraine’s role as a transit country for gas 
to European markets. Ukrainian politicians and analysts have long been 
aware of both the options and challenges of serving as the major link for 
Russian gas to the EU. The claim that the EU–Ukraine–Russia triangle is 
‘decisive for energy security in the Eurasian region’ is indeed an under-
statement. Domestic diversification is in fact the only viable strategy for 
Ukraine to meet Russian influence in the energy sector, and closer col-
laboration with the EU is a possible way in which to escape a dilemma 
(Razumkov Centre 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, Ukraine has tried to sustain its planned balancing act be-
tween Russia and the EU. In July 2010, the Ukrainian government reiter-
ated that a ‘tripartite’ structure consisting of the EU, Russia and Ukraine 
should be set up for the modernization of the Ukrainian pipeline system. 
The project was framed as a construction project for enhancing gas de-
liveries to the European markets, increasing the capacity of the current 
network with 60 bcm annually (Gavrish 2010b).38 Moreover, the Ukrain-
ian government moved rapidly to push a draft law on market liberaliza-
tion through the Rada. The law was adopted at the first reading on 5 July 
(Mordyushenko & Gavrish 2010) and in a final reading only seven days 
later (Mordyushenko 2010). This was interpreted as a first step toward 
realizing the ‘tripartite’ scheme, allowing for equal access of contracting 
partners to Ukraine’s 13 underground gas storage sites. The law also 
stipulated the division of Ukraine’s national companies into three sepa-
                                                 
38  The tripartite scheme was not a novel invention, but the resurrection of a proposal from 
2002. At that time, however, there was, as observed by James Sherr, no consortium and no 
bypass project (South Stream) (Sherr 2010a: 3).  
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rate companies, allegedly in accordance with the proposals of the Euro-
pean Commission, thus putting any talk about a Naftogaz and Gazprom 
merger on hold (ibid.). Still, Kommersant claimed, the law also opened for 
Gazprom ownership in Ukraine’s pipeline system; and, while it did not 
stipulate Russian participation in the process of modernizing the pipeline 
system, it allegedly ‘allowed for it’ (ibid.).  
 
The final condition for releasing the promised EU support was a transi-
tion to market prices at Ukraine’s internal gas market. However, the tax 
scheme negotiated with Russia at the Kharkov summit lowered the price 
of Russian gas in the second quarter, from 305 to 232 USD per 1000 cu-
bic metres – far below market price (Gavrish & Grib 2010e). Hence, the 
EU support was not released (ibid.). In August 2010, the Ukrainian gov-
ernment proposed to scrap the custom-free formula, and to fix prices at 
the level of southeastern Europe. In return Ukraine would buy more gas 
from Russia (55 to 75 bcm annually) as well as granting Gazprom access 
to the Pallas project in the Black Sea. Russia responded by reiterating 
that Ukraine could gain access to gas fields in Russia only if it accepted 
the merger of Gazprom and Naftogaz assets in a new company (Gavrish 
& Grib 2010g). If this was accepted, access could be given to Yamal and 
Astrakhan (Gavrish & Grib 2010h). To sweeten the pill, Russia threw in 
the prospect of selling gas to Ukrainian consumers at the same rate as on 
the Russian domestic market, i.e. at 60 USD per 1000 cubic metres 
(Gavrish & Grib 2010f).39 
 
While the Ukrainian government wanted access to Urengoy, and moti-
vated this by lower investment costs, more effective production and the 
need to invest in the pipeline system, 40 it was difficult to find a way to 
balance Russia’s demanding offers. There is also a question of whether 
the government wanted to. In October 2010, the Ukrainian government 
instructed the Rada to revise the law on the pipeline transport system, 
especially paragraph 7, which prohibited a re-opening of the privatization 
of the pipeline system. This would effectively open a back door for the 
government, making it possible to accept the conditions for a merger as 
presented by Russia and to permit Gazprom to obtain a share in the 
Ukrainian pipeline network (Gavrish & Grib 2010j). The Ministry of En-
ergy stated that it would support the initiative to have the Rada revise the 
law – more specifically, the part that prevented any reorganization of the 
already privatized pipeline system in Ukraine (ibid.). This would allow 
Gazprom and Naftogaz to merge, Kommersant noted, and would further 
promote the allegedly ‘gas-driven’ brotherhood of Russia and Ukraine 
(ibid.).  
 
                                                 
39  Within three years, however, Russia also intends to charge market prices in the domestic 
market.  
40  Ukrainian officials argued that the 2.5 billion USD earmarked for the pipeline system would 
be lost in the investment and production costs at Yamal or Astrakhan (ibid.).  
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Moreover, this tribute to Russia would allow Ukraine to gain access to 
hydrocarbon deposits in Russia, while giving Russia a share in the 
Ukrainian offshore field Pallas. Ukraine could also secure low domestic 
prices on gas (ibid.).41 Prime Minister Azarov then travelled to Brussels 
to announce that it would not be possible to advance the free trade 
agreement with the EU before the planned summit in November. 
Azarov gave ‘the necessity of making new dispositions in the energy sec-
tor’ as the reason, and was seconded by a spokesperson from the Minis-
try of Finance, who indicated that ‘Ukraine’s entry into the European 
Energy Community raises new questions that should be decided upon’ 
(Sidorenko 2010f). 
 
Factbox 4. Nord Stream  
Initiated (year and partners) 1997 (Gazprom and Finnish Neste); re-
named Nord Stream (2006) 
Annual capacity 27.5 bcm (55 bcm indicated in Åslund et 
al. 2010). 
Estimated costs 8.8 billion EUR (subsea) plus 6 billion 
EUR onshore facilities (Germany and 
Russia). 
Other partners Saipem (Italy, 2007), Gasunie (Nether-
lands, 2007), GDF Suez (France, 2008), 
Rolls Royce (UK, 2008),  
Length 1,222 kilometres (subsea) 
End of project period Operational in 2012 
Countries affected Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Finland 
and Estonia.  
Resource feeders Russia 
Map: See factbox 3 
 
 
 
In summary, the energy talks between Ukraine and Russia have showed 
that imperfect energy markets and volatile and shifting alliances are in-
gredients in the pipeline games. In the case of Ukraine, policies are 
rooted in energy dependencies and transit issues. The EU plays an awk-
ward role in this game – both as a provider of incentives, and as depend-
ent on energy transit. The consequences of the Kharkov Agreement for 
Black Sea security remain uncertain. True, Russia attached new moderni-
zation plans to the agreement, claiming that towards 2020, the naval base 
was to receive 15 new frigates and diesel-driven submarines (Ryabchun 
& Konovalov 2010). At a lecture at Taras Schevchenko University, 
Dmitry Medvedev stated that the agreement to extend the leasing of the 
naval base would help ‘preserve status quo’ and avoid any ‘serious shake-
ups in the Black Sea region’ (Sidorenko 2010d). Russia’s ambitions seem 
to reach further than the status quo, however, as evidenced by develop-
ments on the eastern shore of the Black Sea.42  
                                                 
41  Gavrish & Grib (2010j) suggested that Ukraine would receive a site that could provide 30 
billion bcm annually, which would help to cover Ukraine’s domestic needs. These needs are 
estimated at between 60 and 75 bcm annually by Chow & Elkind (2009).  
42  See Helge Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø in this report.  
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Conclusions 
The impact of the Kharkov Agreement on the relationship between 
Ukraine and Russia should not be underestimated. Russia will hold 
greater influence in Ukraine, which will affect the regional policies of 
both the EU and Black Sea littoral states like Turkey. In the event that 
Russia stipulates conditions for Ukraine that are incompatible with EU 
standards, the EU will have to work hard to promote conditionality and 
European values. If bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia come 
to matter more, EU energy conditionality and regional posture will de-
cline. As of this writing, the EU does not seem to envisage any alterna-
tive to transit through Ukraine, although it has sought to reactivate the 
Nabucco project (Socor 2011). For the EU, other pipeline projects, such 
as South Stream or Nord Stream, would not be viable alternatives. Ac-
cording to EU Commissioner for Energy Günther Ettiger, for the next 
decades the most important transport grid will go through Ukraine, so 
alternative pipelines would have only a back-up function. Moreover, the 
EU cannot not interfere with any disruption of gas supplies – only ‘hope 
that the European contracts held by Gazprom would be kept’ (Gavrish 
& Grib 2010d).  
 
This may be true, but the fact that Russia has called the shots was evi-
denced by the signing of a package of agreements between Prime Minis-
ters Azarov and Putin on 27 October 2010 that may open for co-
management of Ukraine’s transit network by the EU and Russia. At the 
meeting of the intergovernmental Ukraine–Russia commission for eco-
nomic cooperation, a protocol on cooperation between the energy com-
panies of the two countries was signed – with the EU present on the 
sidelines.43 Interestingly, this protocol treats gas transit separately from 
the overall cooperation within this sector: Ukraine and Russia are to 
draw up two separate interstate agreements, one on coordinating the 
work on a ‘unified energy system’ for the two countries, and one on co-
operation in the gas sector. The former be presented by 31 December 
2010, the latter by 1 June 2011 (ibid.). Potentially, this could imply that 
Russia will first set the premises for ownership structures in the Ukrain-
ian gas sector, and then define the graphics for cooperation with the EU. 
In other words, by removing gas transit from the overall sector agree-
ment, Russia could delay any international agreement involving the EU 
until Russian business networks had been positioned in Ukraine’s vitally 
important energy transport sector.  
 
It may seem that the EU has been engaged in a tripartite scheme that 
puts in question the normative effect of the Union on domestic policies 
in Ukraine, opening up for Russian-energy driven unilateralism. Symp-
tomatically, Ukraine’s independence as a transit country was questioned 
when Gazprom in September 2010 put pressure on Naftogaz to block 
                                                 
43  On the one hand, this may imply that the door is open for the EU. Some Ukrainian sources 
have a different view, however; see e.g. Sidorenko 2010g.  
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the transit of E.ON Ruhrgas gas to Poland. Gazprom argued that a Pol-
ish company had bought 3 bcm of gas without ‘coordinating’ this with 
Gazprom, and instructed Naftogaz to block transit through the Ukrain-
ian pipeline system (Gavrish & Grib 2010i). Russia was thus using 
Naftogaz as a ‘proxy’ – Naftogaz had no independent position. Indeed, 
the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy argued that they were trying to per-
suade Russia to drop South Stream, and hence that a conflict over 3 bcm 
gas was inexpedient.44  
 
To summarize, if the EU is a player in the geopolitics of energy, it is a 
player with certain limitations. The EU does not have sufficient influence 
to affect the pricing games between Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, Rus-
sia’s influence in Ukraine is growing. This influence is economic and po-
litical; in part, this confirms the assertion of Donaldson and Nogee 
(2009: 339) that international relations are ‘unipolar in the military realm, 
and multipolar in diplomacy, in economic transactions and in transna-
tional relations’, with Russia shaping its future position in the junction 
between the two. Moreover, as the EU recognizes its energy dependency 
on Russia, it is also invited to take on a more ‘geopolitical’ role in defin-
ing the terms of transit. While the Ukrainian government presented its 
strategic balancing policy as a modernization of Ukraine’s foreign policy 
based on the idea not to antagonize Europe and Russia but to ‘unite’ the 
two (Grishchenko 2010), the energy transit dimension has accentuated 
the competition between EU standards and Russian investment schemes. 
For the EU, energy supply is more important than norms in the 
neighbourhood, simply because disrupted transits will affect EU border 
areas.  
 
To conclude, the current reconfiguration of Black Sea regional politics 
analysed in this section is driven by the quest for energy and control over 
transit that may foster interdependence, but not strong institutions. 
Volatile alliances are at the core of the competitive game, but these are 
not necessarily conflict drivers. To be sure, the geopolitical gambit that 
Russia lays around the South Stream pipeline does involve offers of stra-
tegic alliances. Indirectly, this scheme is related to the weakness of the 
EU as a foreign policy actor: the weaker the EU’s incentive system is, the 
more room is there for Russian capital and ‘special alliances’ to flourish. 
Russia’s energy appeals and overtures to Turkey are a case in point, but 
also one that demonstrates that Russia cannot expect to achieve en-
dorsement of all its initiatives.  
                                                 
44  Russia has effectively employed its version of multipolarity to gain access to the EU’s internal 
energy markets. In October 2010 Putin signed a contract between Rosneft and Petroelos de 
Venezuela’s refinery capacity, gaining control over 10% of total refinery capacity in Germany. 
The sale will come into effect only in 2011 and only after German and EU approval, but the 
event clearly signals a deeper dependency on Russian oil for Germany. As a carrot, Russia has 
announced that it will increase its deliveries of oil to Germany. As Vladimir Socor (2010) 
points out, Rosneft places 18% of its total refinery capacity in the heart of the European 
market, and gains refining capacities for 11.5 million tons crude oil annually. 
South Caucasus: Sovereignty Issues 
and De Facto States45 
The 2008 declaration of independence of Kosovo and the Russo–
Georgian war over South Ossetia later that same year catapulted the 
Eurasian de facto states46 into the attention of the international commu-
nity. Not that the de facto states were entirely new to the scene – ever 
since the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia several statelike 
entities have existed along Europe’s fringes. However, the secessionist 
conflicts from which these de facto states emerged had been ‘frozen’ for 
more than a decade, resulting in dwindling attention from politicians and 
media alike. 
 
De facto states are states with no, or only partial, international recogni-
tion. Their very existence challenges the existing world order, based as it 
is on reciprocal and universal recognition of state actors. And yet, it ap-
pears that the three South Caucasian de facto states–Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh – cannot be brushed off as simply a 
transitory phenomenon connected to the disintegration of the Soviet 
empire. They have existed for nearly two decades now; and some other 
de facto states can refer to an even longer history.47 
 
The de facto states have remained an understudied phenomenon.48 Ini-
tial research focused primarily on the roots of the secessionist conflicts 
or designs for their solution. The inner dynamics of the de facto states 
have been generally ignored, with reference being made mainly to these 
states as ‘black holes’ that harbour terrorists and engage in the smuggling 
of weapons, drugs and human trafficking. Only recently has the focus 
turned to the internal developments in the de facto states in an attempt 
                                                 
45  Written by Helge Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø.  
46  There is no universal agreement on terminology concerning what to call these entities – dif-
ferent authors have at various stages identified them as ‘unrecognized states’ (King 2001), 
‘pseudo-states’ (Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 1999), ‘quasi-states’ (Kolstø 2006) and ‘contested 
states’ (Geldenhuys 2009). Whereas several of these terms have some merit in the sense that 
they indicate essential characteristics of these entities, there seems to be an emerging consen-
sus on the term ‘de facto’ states, and we will therefore use this appellation. The distinction 
between de facto states and regular restive regions is that the former have officially declared 
independence from their parent state and have been able to hold on to such de facto inde-
pendence for some time (Kolstø 2006 argues for a minimum of two years). 
47  The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1974 (officially proclaimed in 
1983), and is still recognized only by Turkey. Some would also include Taiwan (Republic of 
China) in the group of de facto states. (Taiwan is currently recognized by 23 states.)  
48  Some of the most important attempts to theorize around de facto states include Pegg (1998), 
Kolstø (2006) and Caspersen & Stansfield (2011). For more empirically focused studies of 
the South Caucasian de facto states, see e.g. Lynch (2004) and Kolstø & Blakkisrud (2008).  
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to understand the nature of these regimes and how they have been cop-
ing with non-recognition.49 
 
The aim of this case study is to contribute to the research on de facto 
states by examining some of the dynamics that characterize the separatist 
conflicts in the South Caucasus.50 In the following, we will examine the 
track record of the de facto states when it comes to consolidating state 
and nation through establishing territorial control and institutionalizing 
power (both processes pertaining to state-building), and strengthening 
identification with – and thus support for – the de facto state (nation-
building). Both these processes are aimed at strengthening internal sov-
ereignty (Kolstø 2006). Then we turn to the de facto states’ relations 
with the outside world, especially the interaction between parent and pa-
tron states. Observing that the de facto states’ quest for external sover-
eignty in the form of international recognition does not seem to be mov-
ing forward, while at the same time negotiations for a peaceful settle-
ment within the borders of the parent states remain stalled, we conclude 
that, for the foreseeable future, the world is likely to have to live with a 
new type of statelike entities in the international system, entities that find 
themselves in an intermediate position between autonomy-seeking re-
gions and fully recognized states: the de facto state with its lack of – or 
only partial – international recognition.  
State-building and Nation-building 
The secessionist conflicts in the South Caucasus have often been de-
scribed as ‘frozen conflicts’ (see e.g. Blank 2008). In a certain sense, this 
is an accurate depiction. There is ‘no peace, no war’ (Walker 1998): With 
the exception of the 2008 war in Georgia, there has neither been dis-
cernible progress toward conflict resolution, nor open warfare since the 
conclusion of ceasefire agreements in the early 1990s.51 Such a descrip-
tion nevertheless runs the risk of under-communicating the dynamics on 
the ground. As the years pass by, the vestiges of a feeling of communal-
ity across the de facto borders gradually fade, and the new, post-conflict 
institutional and economic arrangements become increasingly en-
trenched. The de facto states of today are clearly very different entities 
                                                 
49  Important attempts to explore internal dynamics of the evolving regimes of Eurasian de facto 
states include Popescu (2006), Kolstø & Blakkisrud (2008), Matsuzato (2008), Protsyk (2009) 
and Blakkisrud & Kolstø (2011). 
50  The study draws on fieldwork carried out in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh in September 
2010 and more than 20 interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, journalists and NGO activ-
ists. We decided against including South Ossetia due to an assessment of the security situa-
tion. Whereas it is relatively uncomplicated to enter Abkhazia from Sochi, Russia, and Na-
gorno-Karabakh from Armenia, we would have had to fly to Vladikavkaz and travel through 
the Roki Tunnel to get to South Ossetia. As the situation in this part of the North Caucasus 
is volatile, we found it advisable to drop the visit to Tskhinvali. However, both authors have 
carried out fieldwork in South Ossetia, as well as the other two South Caucasian de facto 
states, before the 2008 war. 
51  This is not to say that the ‘frozen conflicts’ have not claimed casualties: In the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict alone, more than 3000 people have been killed in skirmishes along the de 
facto border since the conclusion of the ceasefire. 
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from those that declared their sovereignty in the early 1990s. This is not 
just a matter of generational change, but the result of deliberate policies 
on the part of the de facto authorities. Behind the ‘frozen’ ceasefire line, 
they have actively fostered a sense of common identity among the local 
population and a loyalty towards the would-be state. As Charles King 
(2001: 525) puts it, the territorial separatists of the 1990s have become 
the state-builders of the early 2000s. 
Establishing Territorial Control  
In order to be able to proceed with state-building, the de facto authori-
ties52 have to control at least part of the territory they lay claim to. De-
spite substantial variation among our three cases, up to the 2008 war 
none of the South Caucasian de facto states had succeeded in acquiring 
full control over the territory of the previously autonomous entities from 
which they had sprung. 
 
In 1993, Abkhazian53 separatists had succeeded in pushing the Georgian 
forces back across the Inguri River, the administrative border between 
Abkhazia and Georgia proper. However, for all practical purposes, the 
northeastern corner of the republic, the Upper Kodori Valley, remained 
outside the reach of either Sukhumi or Tbilisi for more than a decade.54 
In 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili dispatched police forces 
to Kodori to bring the region back under central control. This repre-
sented a major blow to the de facto authorities, not least since Tbilisi 
went on to develop Kodori as a bridgehead for the future reintegration 
of the whole of Abkhazia, setting up an interim capital in the village of 
Chkhalta, to which part of the pro-Georgian Abkhazian government in 
exile was then relocated.55 
 
In South Ossetia, the territorial control of the de facto authorities was 
even more precarious, with the territory along the ceasefire line dotted 
by a patchwork of Ossetian and Georgian villages with diverging loyal-
                                                 
52  The authorities, institutions and borders of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh 
are all considered ‘de facto’ due to the lack of international recognition – or since 2008, only 
partial international recognition. To avoid heavy phrasing, however, we have not repeated the 
qualifier ‘de facto’ each time we use a noun referring to these entities. This should in no way 
be construed as taking a stance in the conflict. Likewise, the use of names is politicized in all 
three conflicts. We have opted to employ the forms that are most commonly used in English 
– e.g. Stepanakert, not Khankendi; Sukhumi, not Sokhumi, Sukhum or Aqwa; and Tskhinvali, 
not Tskhinval or Ch’reba. Again, this should not be seen as taking sides, simply as a prag-
matic solution. 
53  With the term ‘Abkhazian’, we refer to residents or representatives of Abkhazia, irrespective 
of ethnic origin. The term ‘Abkhaz’ is used to denote a person of Abkhaz ethnicity. 
54  According to the 1994 Moscow Agreement, the ceasefire line was drawn across the Kodori 
Gorge, although Georgian forces were obliged to pull out of Upper Kodori. Until 2006, this 
region was ruled by regional strongman Emzar Kvitsani. In addition, the de facto authorities’ 
control over the traditionally Georgian/Mingrelian populated Gali region has at times been 
tenuous.  
55  When Georgian forces retreated from Sukhumi in 1993, the pro-Georgian part of the 
Abkhazian Council of Ministers evacuated to Tbilisi. Georgia still recognizes this as the le-
gitimate government of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic. 
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ties.56 In 2006, the situation was further aggravated by an internal rift 
within the South Ossetian elite: After having fallen out with South Osse-
tian President Eduard Kokoity, former Prime Minister Dmitrii Sanakoev 
switched sides and declared his loyalty to Tbilisi. Subsequently, with 
Georgian support, he was elected head of the rival ‘Provisional Adminis-
trative Entity of South Ossetia’.  
 
In the years leading up to the 2008 war, the authority of the de facto au-
thorities in both Sukhumi and Tskhinvali was thus challenged by rivalling 
structures established within the borders of the former autonomies. The 
war was to change this. With the help of Russian forces, the Abkhazian 
army drove the pro-Georgian government out of Kodori, and even more 
significant gains were made on the South Ossetian front. When the Rus-
sian Federation recognized the two de facto states in late August 2008, it 
was thus within the old borders of the former autonomies. 
 
All the same, as regards securing territorial control, the de facto authori-
ties in Nagorno-Karabakh have undoubtedly been the most successful of 
the three. When the ceasefire was concluded in 1994, Karabakhian forces 
controlled the entire territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), save its easternmost parts.57 In addition, 
Stepanakert had captured, fully or partially, seven Azerbaijani regions 
surrounding the former autonomous oblast58 – including the strategically 
important Lachin Corridor, a narrow sliver of land that used to separate 
the NKAO from Armenia.  
 
Up to the mid-2000s, the Karabakhian de facto authorities usually re-
ferred to the formerly Azeri-populated territories as ‘the liberated territo-
ries’ (elsewhere, in diplomatic circles as well as in the literature, they are 
commonly referred to as ‘the occupied territories’) and as such, clearly as 
distinct from the rest of territory under the control of Stepanakert. With 
the exception of the Lachin Corridor, these regions were frequently seen 
as a bargaining chip that could be traded in return for recognition of 
some kind of special status for Nagorno-Karabakh. With the adoption of 
a Karabakhian constitution in 2006, however, the liberated/occupied ter-
ritories were merged with the neighbouring Karabakhian administrative 
entities.59 On official maps produced in Stepanakert, the ‘liberated’ re-
gions have now disappeared, whereas the Azerbaijani Shahumyan region 
                                                 
56  For an excellent map showing the pre-2008 de facto border as well as the ethnic composition 
of South Ossetian villages, see Bartuzi (2006). 
57  More specifically, the easternmost parts of the Martuni and Martakert regions, together com-
prising some 12.8% of the territory of the NKAO.  
58  The ‘non-NKAO’ territory currently under the control of Stepanakert actually makes up two 
thirds of the territory of the de facto republic. In official Azerbaijani discourse on the con-
flict, reference is routinely made to the occupation of 20% of Azerbaijani territory. In reality, 
the de facto authorities control approximately 13% of the internationally recognized territory 
of Azerbaijan (see de Waal 2003: 284–86). 
59  According to Article 142, ‘Till the restoration of the state territorial integrity of the Nagorno 
Karabakh Republic and the adjustment of its borders public authority is exercised on the ter-
ritory under factual jurisdiction of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh’ (Constitution of the 
Nagorno Karabakh Republic 2006). 
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is shown as ‘occupied’.60 By formalizing the status quo, the Karabakhians 
have raised the bar for a negotiated solution to the conflict. Today, Ste-
panakert seems very reluctant to yield any territory to Baku.61 In public 
discourse, it is frequently claimed that these territories were ‘taken by 
blood’ and therefore cannot possibly be ceded voluntarily. 
 
To sum up, today all three South Caucasian de facto states have secured 
physical control over (almost) the entire territory to which they lay claim. 
This has made them status-quo oriented actors – although their ultimate 
goal is international recognition, neither war nor negotiations are likely to 
strengthen their positions concerning territorial control.62 
 
Factbox 5. Abkhazia 
 
Declaration of independence 
 
12 October 1999 (declaration of sover-
eignty 25 August 1990)  
Ceasefire concluded 14 May 1994 (fighting ended with the fall 
of Sukhumi, 27 September 1993) 
Area 8,400 km2 
Population size (official estimate) 216,000 (2003 census) 
Capital Sukhumi 
Heads of state Vladislav Ardzinba (1994–2005) 
Sergei Bagapsh (2005– ) 
Parliamentary elections 1996, 2002, 2007 
GDP per capita USD 2,370 (2009)* 
 
 
 
* Official data from the website of the de facto president, available at 
www.abkhaziagov.org/en/news/detail.php?ID=32339. 
 
                                                 
60  Shahumyan is a formerly Armenian-populated region north of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Ar-
menian population was forcibly deported by Soviet authorities in the spring of 1991 as part 
of ‘Operation Ring’, an attempt to defuse ethnic tensions in Azerbaijan. 
61 This was confirmed in numerous interviews during our fieldwork in Stepanakert in September 
2010. 
62 A negotiated solution would, at least in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, be likely to entail sur-
rendering territory; in all three cases, it would entail the return of IDPs/refugees and a weak-
ening of the position of the titular group. 
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Institutionalizing Power: Elections and the Development of  
Democracy 
As to the consolidation of political power, neither the Soviet heritage of 
single-party rule nor post-conflict developments with uncertainty over 
future status, lack of international recognition, and a creeping siege men-
tality have been conducive to fostering pluralism. All the same, all three 
South Caucasian de facto states have – at least on the rhetorical level – 
embraced democratic ideals and participatory democracy: they have or-
ganized multi-candidate elections to new executive and legislative bodies 
and have – to varying degrees – allowed the opposition to be represented 
in the parliament. External incentives may well have been more impor-
tant than internal pressure in fostering these developments,63 but the 
outcome has nevertheless been that the de facto states now display most 
of the formal trappings of democratic statehood (Caspersen 2008a). At 
the same time, the political regimes that have emerged in the de facto 
states do not differ markedly from those of (most) other post-Soviet 
states: there is a preference for strong presidencies; parliaments are weak; 
the party systems underdeveloped; and control over ‘administrative re-
sources’ is seen as crucial for the outcome of electoral processes.  
 
There are, however, also distinct differences among the three de facto 
states. South Ossetia undoubtedly has the weakest democratic creden-
tials. Here institution-building appears to have been given less priority 
than in the two other entities. One explanation may be that from the 
very beginning, the aim of the South Ossetians has been to unite with 
their ethnic brethren in North Ossetia rather than to pursue independent 
statehood.64 On the positive side, the current president, Eduard Kokoity, 
ran against and defeated incumbent Lyudvig Chibirov in the 2001 presi-
dential elections.65 In these elections Kokoity narrowly defeated his main 
opponent in the run-off. The 2006 elections produced a more Soviet-
style result, however, with Kokoity officially receiving 98.1% of the vote.  
 
The South Ossetian parliament has limited powers, and is currently 
dominated by Kokoity’s party, Unity.66 In the 2009 elections, Unity won 
46% of the vote, and 17 seats in the parliament; 9 seats went to the Peo-
ple’s Party and 8 seats to the Communist Party. Although officially the 
current chairman of the parliament is a member of the ‘opposition’ 
                                                 
63  An important incentive for embracing democracy was the ‘Standards before status’ policy. 
This refers to the benchmarks the UN introduced in 2003 in connection with Kosovo’s aspi-
rations to independence. The Kosovar leaders were told that these standards would have to 
be met before the status question could be resolved (Caspersen 2008a). 
64  According to Article 8 of the South Ossetian Constitution, South Ossetia ‘builds its relations 
with the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania, on ethnic, national and historical-administrative 
unity and on socio-economic and cultural integration’ (Konstitutsiya …2001). 
65  Chibirov finished third. Kokoity’s victory has been credited to the support of the powerful 
Tedeev clan, which had previously worked together with Chibirov but now funded Kokoity’s 
campaign (Dzugayev 2005). In 2003, Kokoity consolidated his grip on power by ousting the 
Tedeevs from the South Ossetian security structures. 
66  It is no coincidence that the party bears the same name as the previous ‘Party of Power’ in 
Russia: Unity was established with a similar goal and currently collaborates with Putin’s 
United Russia. 
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(Stanislav Kochiev of the Communist Party), politics is more focused on 
personalities than on parties, and there are no major differences among 
the three parties in the sitting parliament.67 In addition, the South Osse-
tian parliament plays a marginal role, even by post-Soviet standards, and 
political power rests with the president68 – although since 2008, Kokoity 
has had to cede certain competencies to Russian citizens who at the be-
hest of Moscow have been included in the Ossetian administration. To-
day, however, Kokoity’s rule is formally drawing to an end. According to 
the constitution, he is barred from seeking a third term in 2011, and the 
next few months will thus represent a test of how strong his control over 
the republic really is.69 
 
Although the South Ossetian incumbent was defeated in the 2001 presi-
dential elections, the most openly contested presidential election in the 
South Caucasian de facto states so far took place in Abkhazia. In 2004, 
ailing incumbent Vladislav Ardzinba chose not to seek re-election. His 
preferred successor was Prime Minister Raul Khadjimba. This succession 
scheme had also got the stamp of approval from Moscow. But contrary 
to expectations, the Abkhazian electorate rallied behind former Prime 
Minister Sergei Bagapsh. When Bagapsh won the first round with a slim 
majority (50.1% of the vote), Khadjimba (who got 34.6%) refused to ac-
knowledge defeat, and demanded new elections.70 The subsequent stand-
off brought the republic to the brink of civil war. In the end, a compro-
mise was reached: Bagapsh and Khadjimba agreed to run as a team in 
new elections scheduled for March 2005 (with Bagapsh as president, 
Khadjimba as vice president). This awkward alliance won 91.4% of the 
vote and formally survived up to spring 2009. In the elections in De-
cember that year, Bagapsh won an easy victory with 61.1% of the vote, 
while Khadjimba this time finished a distant second with 15.3%.71 
 
A distinctive trait of Abkhazian politics is the tendency toward ethno-
cracy. Unlike in South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, the Abkhazian 
president is required not only to know the state language – he or she 
must also belong to the titular ethnic group. Likewise, the Abkhazian 
parliament is completely dominated by ethnic Abkhaz. That the parlia-
ment should be more or less mono-ethnic is not surprising in South Os-
setia or Nagorno-Karabakh, given the ethnic composition of these de 
facto states (see below). In Abkhazia, however, the Abkhaz are generally 
                                                 
67  The only pro-Georgian party, Sanakoev’s Salvation Union of South Ossetia, evacuated to 
Georgia proper in connection with the 2008 war.  
68  See Konstitutsiya (2001), articles 47–55, especially the long list of presidential prerogatives in 
article 50. 
69  Kokoity has drawn increasing criticism, from both former members of the local elite and 
Russian news media, for the widespread corruption in connection with reconstruction efforts 
after the 2008 war. 
70  Khadjimba also accused Bagapsh of being too pro-Georgian, casting doubt about his com-
mitment to an independent Abkhazia. 
71  The term of office is five years, and Bagapsh’s second and final term will end in 2014. Specu-
lations about his successor are already ripe. In our interviews in Sukhumi in September 2010, 
current Vice President Aleksandr Ankvab was frequently mentioned as the most likely candi-
date.  
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estimated to constitute only about a third of the total population, with 
the Armenian and the Georgian/Mingrelian populations being of almost 
the same size.72 In its current convocation, 26 of 35 members of the 
Abkhazian parliament are ethnic Abkhaz, and there are only three Ar-
menians and two Georgians.73 That the Georgians/Mingrelians have 
been temporarily disenfranchised and are only slowly being admitted into 
the electorate is perhaps not that surprising, but it is an open question 
how long the Armenians will remain content to be deprived of political 
influence. So far, the other ethnic groups seem to accept that the Abkhaz 
monopolize politics and bureaucracy, but over time, there is reason to 
expect the ethnocratic model to come under pressure.74 
 
In Nagorno-Karabakh, the presidency has changed hands three times 
since the declaration of independence – but, unlike in the two other de 
facto states, this has been closely orchestrated processes, involving the 
orderly transfer of power from an incumbent to a handpicked successor. 
The first de facto president of Nagorno-Karabakh, Robert Kocharyan, 
stepped down in 1997 in order to become Prime Minister of Armenia.75 
In the subsequent elections, Kocharyan’s long-time ally Arkadi Ghu-
kasyan was elected president. During his rule, a Karabkahian constitution 
was adopted which, inter alia, introduced the limit of two consecutive 
presidential terms. After some hesitation, Ghukasyan opted to step down 
at the end of his second term in 2007, transferring power to Bako Sa-
hakyan. With the support of all major political parties, Sahakyan was 
elected with 85.1% of the vote.  
 
According to one observer, presidential elections in Nagorno-Karabakh 
are too important to be publicly contested – the major actors work out 
the succession question behind the scenes, hence the unanimous support 
for the regime’s candidates.76 Nevertheless, Nagorno-Karabakh is rated 
by Freedom House as the most democratic of the three de facto states in 
the South Caucasus (Freedom House 2010). In fact, Nagorno-Karabakh 
has consistently received a better rating than Azerbaijan as regards politi-
cal rights – a point not missed in the Karabakhian discourse on sover-
eignty, the argument being made that the West cannot sacrifice a ‘de-
mocratic’ Nagorno-Karabakh to the ‘authoritarian’ Azerbaijan (i.e. that 
                                                 
72  For a discussion of the controversies around the ethnic composition of Abkhazia, see the 
section on identity and nation-building below. 
73  The final four members of the de facto parliament are three Russians and a Turk. 
74  Many observers point to the Soviet tradition of bestowing special rights upon the titular na-
tions as an explanation of why the other groups do not challenge the Abkhaz monopoliza-
tion of power. This was confirmed in several interviews the authors conducted in Sukhumi in 
September 2010. 
75  Among the de facto states, the level of elite integration between Nagorno-Karabakh and its 
parent state, Armenia, represents an exceptional case: Whereas in Abkhazia, and in particular 
in South Ossetia, Russian citizens have been parachuted into local power structures, an op-
posite trend has been witnessed in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Karabakhians to some extent 
have monopolized power in Yerevan. 
76  Authors’ interview with Manvel Sarkisyan, researcher at Armenian Centre for Strategic and 
National Studies and former advisor to President Ghukasyan 2000–05, Yerevan, 17 Septem-
ber 2010. 
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democracy will trump territorial integrity when it comes to the future 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh).77 Abkhazia, on the other hand, is currently 
trailing Georgia by one point in the same rating, both being categorized 
as ‘partly free’; and South Ossetia is said to be ‘not free’ (ibid.).78 Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, the lack of international recognition does not ap-
pear to have had an impact on the level of democracy development: 
when it comes to respect for political rights, the de facto states seem to 
do not much worse, and perhaps even better, than the states from which 
they are seeking to secede.  
 
Factbox 6. Nagorno-Karabakh 
 
Declaration of independence 
 
6 January 1992  
Ceasefire concluded 16 May 1994 
Area 11,500 km2 
Population size (official estimate) 141,000* 
Capital Stepanakert 
Head of state Robert Kocharyan (1994–97) 
Leonard Petrosyan (acting) (1997) 
Arkadi Ghukasyan (1997–2007) 
Bako Sahakyan (2007– ) 
Parliamentary elections 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
GDP per capita USD 2,040 (2008)** 
 
 
 
* Official estimate for 2010 from the website of the de facto president, available at 
www.president.nkr.am/ru/nkr/statePower. 
** Calculated based on data in Statistical Yearbook… (2009). 
 
                                                 
77  Authors’ interviews in Stepanakert, September 2010. For a discussion of democracy devel-
opment in Nagorno-Karabakh, see Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2010. 
78  Nagorno-Karabakh has scored 5 on ‘political rights’ every year since 2002, while Abkhazia 
improved its score from 6 to 5 in 2006. South Ossetia, which was included in the rating only 
in 2009, has received the lowest possible score – 7. 
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Identification with and Support for the De Facto State 
All three South Caucasian de facto states initially mobilized for inde-
pendence under the banner of national self-determination. During the 
Soviet period, Abkhazia had enjoyed status as an autonomous republic 
whereas both Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia had been recog-
nized as autonomous oblasts. During the final years of the USSR, a wave 
of demands for enhanced sovereignty swept across the Union. As the 
Union unravelled, the autonomies saw an opportunity to strengthen their 
position, and secessionist aspirations were further stimulated by the re-
luctance of the new authorities in Tbilisi and Baku to accommodate their 
ethnic minorities. The result was violent secessionist conflicts, large 
numbers of IDPs – and a subsequent strengthening of the position of 
the titular nation within the autonomies/de facto states. 
 
The most fundamental changes took place in Nagorno-Karabakh. Dur-
ing the Soviet period, the population of the NKAO had always been 
composed of an Armenian majority and a substantial Azeri minority. The 
last pre-conflict data stem from the 1979 Soviet census, according to 
which the population of the NKAO included 75.9% Armenians and 
22.8% Azeris (de Waal 2003: 285).79 During the war, however, the entire 
Azeri population was uprooted, not only from the territory of the former 
NKAO, but also the surrounding Azerbajani provinces which fell under 
Stepanakert’s control. Estimates vary: according to the official Azerbai-
jani discourse, the number of Azeri IDPs/refugees amounted to 1 mil-
lion, whereas most outside observers would agree that the figure is closer 
to 750,000 (see e.g. de Waal 2003).80 Population statistics are heavily 
politicized in the secessionist conflicts, but that Nagorno-Karabakh to-
day is ethnically homogeneous with almost no traces of the traditional 
Azeri minority is beyond discussion (according to the 2005 census, the 
population is officially 99.7% Armenian).81 More questionable is the of-
ficial claim that the population now stands at 141,000 (cf. factbox 6) – 
only some 4,000 lower than what was reported to be the ethnic Arme-
nian population in 1989.82 
 
Also the Abkhaz war of secession led to considerable displacement of 
the population. Before the war, the Abkhaz had been a minority within 
the republic: according to the 1989 census, Georgians/Mingrelians made 
up almost half the population (45.7%), while the Abkhaz (17.8%) had to 
                                                 
79  The last Soviet census was held in 1989, but the conflict in the NKAO had already erupted 
by then.  
80  Thomas de Waal (2003: 285) estimates that some 500,000 Azeris from Nagorno-Karabakh 
and the surrounding regions were forced to flee during the war. In addition, the IDP/refugee 
population includes Azeris (and others) that fled Armenia, which brings the total number to 
approximately 750,000 (ibid.). 
81  According to the census, there were only six Azeris left in Nagorno-Karabakh (Rezul’taty 
perepisi…). 
82  In-migration is said to have picked up in recent years, and a state ‘birth encouragement’ pro-
gramme as well as generous support from private donors has sparked what has been de-
scribed as a ‘baby boom’ (Grigoryan 2010a). However, there are no independently confirmed 
figures, and de Waal reports that, as late as in 2000, then de facto Prime Minister Anushavan 
Danilyan referred to population statistics as a ‘state secret’ (de Waal 2003: 284).  
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compete with the Armenians (14.6%) and the Russians (14.4%) for sec-
ond place. In the final days of the war, the Georgian/Mingrelian popula-
tion was forced to leave their homes and evacuate together with the re-
treating Georgian troops. Large tracts of eastern Abkhazia, most promi-
nently the traditionally Mingrelian-populated Gali region, were virtually 
depopulated. In the following years, some of the population of Gali 
trickled back, partly in the form of seasonal migration, with former Gali 
residents tending to their farms during the summer and harvest season 
and then spending the rest of the year in Georgia proper. However, the 
volatile security situation in the Gali region as well as Sukhumi’s reluc-
tance to accept the return of what it considered ‘war criminals’ has pre-
cluded a more permanent return for most of the IDPs.83 
 
Before the war, Abkhazia had more than half a million inhabitants 
(525,000 in 1989). According to the highly contested results of the 2003 
census, the population dropped by more than half, and now stands at 
216,000 (Naselenie Abkhahziya n.d.). However, despite war and economic 
hardship, the number of ethnic Abkhaz had reportedly increased from 
93,300 in 1989 to 94,600 by 2003; they were now claimed to make up 
43.8% of the total population. At the same time, the Georgian/ Mingre-
lian share was said to have dropped to 21.3% and the Russian to 10.8%. 
By contrast, the Armenians had seen a relative strengthening, and now 
constituted 20.8% of the population (ibid.)  
 
Most outside observers dismiss the census results as manipulated84 as 
regards both the total population figure, which is claimed to be much 
lower, and the ethnic breakdown. Representatives of the Armenian mi-
nority speculate that Armenians now actually outnumber the ethnic 
Abkhaz,85 and also the Georgian/Mingrelian population is probably con-
siderably bigger than the 46,000 reported in the census.86 Whereas the 
census may well have been doctored to legitimize Abkhaz dominance, 
the continued uncertainty around the real figures threatens to undermine 
this strategy. Attempts to woo the Abkhaz diaspora (predominantly  
settled in Turkey) to return to their ethnic homeland have produced few 
results thus far. The fear of once again becoming a minority within ‘their’ 
republic has made the de facto authorities rule out a wholesale return of 
IDPs.87 But also without large-scale return, the privileged position of the 
ethnic Abkhaz may soon come under threat.88  
                                                 
83  There are various accounts of the number of IDPs. According to Georgian sources, there are 
212,000, while the Abkhazian de facto authorities operate with the figure of 150,000. Part of 
the discrepancy is probably due to the fact that some 40,000–50,000 IDPs who have returned 
to Gali are still included in the Georgian statistics (ICG 2010a: 9). 
84  Even President Bagapsh has admitted that the number of ethnic Abkhaz is exaggerated, and 
has indicated that the Abkhaz now number approximately 70,000 (ICG 2010a: 8). 
85  Authors’ interviews in Sukhumi in September 2006 and September 2010. 
86  Estimates range from 55,000 to 75,000 (ICG 2010a: 9). 
87  Authors’ interview with Abkhazian de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs Maksim Gunja, Suk-
humi, September 2010. The Georgians/Mingrelians are so far allowed to settle only in the 
Gali region. IDPs from other parts of Abkhazia are not allowed to return. 
88  In the 2009 presidential elections, for instance, most of the Georgian/Mingrelian population 
was disenfranchised as they were not issued passports, a prerequisite for voting in these elec-
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In South Ossetia, there was less displacement during the war of seces-
sion89 as well as more cross-border contacts in its aftermath, something 
which contributed to a relatively low level of ethnic tension. Before the 
war, the population of South Ossetia had stood at 99,000 – 66.2% Os-
setians and 28.8% Georgians. The size and composition of the post-war 
population is disputed, as in the other de facto states. Up until 2008, the 
eastern part of the former autonomous oblast, the Georgian-populated 
Akhalgori region, as well as many villages in the vicinity of the capital 
Tskhinvali, had remained under Georgian control, with people moving 
more or less freely across the de facto border.90 That made it difficult to 
produce exact figures. According to the de facto authorities, approxi-
mately 82,000 people lived in South Ossetia before the renewal of hos-
tilities in 2008, some 60,000 of whom were living in territories under the 
control of Tskhinvali (Pakhomenko 2009).91 
 
Unlike in Abkhazia, where the 2008 war did not significantly alter the 
ethnic balance,92 more than half of the population in South Ossetia fled 
the war zone. Whereas almost all the Ossetians who sought refuge in 
North Ossetia soon returned, the majority of the Georgian population 
are still IDPs in Georgia proper.93 According to the official website of 
the de facto president, South Ossetia in 2009 had 72,000 inhabitants, 
with ethnic Ossetians making up 80% of the population (Pakhomenko 
2009). This figure is hard to reconcile with the fact that, at the same time, 
there were some 20,000 to 24,000 IDPs registered in Georgia (ibid., ICG 
2010b: 1). While the Georgian government claims that the post-2008 
population of South Ossetia stands at somewhere between 8,000 and 
15,000, most external observers estimate it to be around 30,000 (ICG 
2010b: 2).94 
 
Overall, the tendency has been a sharp population decline in all three de 
facto states. This has led to a relative strengthening of the ‘titular nations’ 
                                                 
tions (previously they had been allowed to vote with a temporary registration document). An 
attempt on the eve of the elections to issue citizenship to Gali residents caused uproar among 
the opposition, and the authorities had to backtrack. In the long run, however, it will be diffi-
cult to leave this group without political rights. For an excellent account of the development 
of inter-ethnic relations in Abkhazia, see Trier et al. 2010. 
89  During the war of secession, an estimated 10,000 Georgians fled to Georgia proper and a 
similar number of Ossetians to North Ossetia. Most of these did not return after the cessa-
tion of hostilities. According to the UNHCR, only some 1,300 Georgian and 1,500 Ossetian 
IDPs/refugees had returned by 2005 (Pakhomenko 2009). Nevertheless, the biggest impact 
of the 1991–92 war was on the Ossetian population of Georgia proper: this dropped by 
60,000 compared to the pre-war level (in 1989, 98,000 Ossetians had been living in Georgia 
proper) (ICG 2005: 1)  
90  During a visit to South Ossetia in 2000, we crossed the border between Georgia proper and 
the de facto state several times without being stopped – and without seeing other border per-
sonnel than a single Russian peacekeeper. 
91  As the de facto authorities did not conduct a census, population figures are all estimates. 
92 The main exception being a small group of Svans, a Georgian sub-ethnos living in Upper 
Kodori, which fled Abkhazia as the Georgian forces withdrew. 
93  ICG estimates that 2,500 Georgians now live in South Ossetia, although, given seasonal mi-
gration, this figure rises to 4,000–5,000 during spring and harvest-time (ICG 2010b: 3). 
94  A Russian specialist on demography has, on the basis of indicators such as voters’ lists and 
number of school children, estimated the current population to be in the range of 26,000 to 
32,000 (Pakhomenko 2009). 
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– ranging from establishing a virtually mono-ethnic Nagorno-Karabakh, 
to what constitutes a contested plurality status of the Abkhaz. When the 
titular nation constitutes a clear majority, this obviously makes the na-
tion-building process easier – although nation-builders in Stepanakert 
and Tskhinvali have to strike a balance between emphasizing the nation 
(understood in ethnic terms) within the borders of the de facto state and 
the wider ethnic community to which this group belongs, resulting in a 
sort of ‘waiting-room nation-building’. Pending a future merger of the de 
facto states with their ethnic kin in Armenia and North Ossetia, the de 
facto authorities seek to cultivate a regional sub-identity. This is particu-
larly true in Nagorno-Karabakh, where the current elite have been nur-
turing a new national mythology based on the Karabakhians as the de-
fenders and consciousness of the Armenian nation.95 By contrast, the 
South Ossetians have invested much less in active nation-building. In 
Abkhazia, the emphasis on ‘Abkhazia as the homeland of the Abkhaz’ 
has not yet been seriously challenged, but the ethnocentric approach of 
the Abkhaz elite may risk alienating the Armenian minority, thereby un-
dermining the state-building project as such. 
 
Factbox 7. South Ossetia 
 
Declaration of independence 
 
28 November 1991  
Ceasefire concluded 24 June 1992 
Area 3,900 km2 
Population size (official estimate) 72,000* 
Capital Tskhinvali 
Head of state Lyudvig Chibirov (1993–2001) 
Eduard Kokoity (2001– ) 
Parliamentary elections 1994, 1999, 2004 2009 
GDP per capita NA 
 
 
* Official data from the website of the de facto president, available at  
http://presidentrso.ru/republic.  
                                                 
95  Authors’ interview with, inter alia, Presidential Advisor David Babayan, Stepanakert, Septem-
ber 2010. 
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Relations with the Outside World 
Although the de facto states are by definition cut off from normal inter-
action with the international community, they do not – and cannot – ex-
ist in a vacuum. Thus, they have to seek ways to overcome their isola-
tion. The continued existence of the de facto state is intrinsically con-
nected to its parent and patron states as well as the interrelationships in-
volving these three actors. The ‘parent state’ is the internationally recog-
nized state entity from which the de facto state is trying to break away, 
while ‘the patron state’ is the one that provides the security guarantees 
and political and economic support that allow the de facto state to main-
tain the status quo (see also Caspersen 2008b). In the three cases dis-
cussed here, Armenia serves as a patron state for Nagorno-Karabakh, 
and the Russian Federation for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.96  
Parent States 
The post-conflict relations with the respective parent states have varied 
considerably among the three cases. Up until the 2003 Georgian Rose 
Revolution, relations between Tbilisi and the de facto authorities in 
Tskhinvali were relatively relaxed. There was a lively cross-border trade – 
the sprawling Ergneti Market, which extended across the de facto bor-
der, was for years a major hub for illegal trade in fuel, food and tobacco. 
More importantly, there were also examples of practical cooperation be-
tween Georgian state structures and the South Ossetian de facto authori-
ties.97 As a result, outside observers would often point to the South Os-
setian conflict as the one with the best chances for a peaceful solution.98  
However, the Rose Revolution heralded a more activist approach from 
Tbilisi. Encouraged by the swift and bloodless reintegration of Adjara in 
the spring of 2004,99 President Saakashvili decided to step up pressure 
on the South Ossetian de facto authorities, including depriving them of 
the income from the lucrative trade. Ergneti was closed down, and both 
military and rhetorical pressure was increased,100 culminating with the 
attempt to overrun the South Ossetian de facto regime in a military strike 
                                                 
96  Russia also serves as the patron state of the fourth and final of the still existing de facto states 
in the post-Soviet area, Transnistria. The importance of being backed by a sufficiently strong 
regional power is illustrated by the fate of Chechnya, which for much of the 1990s could be 
described as a de facto state. Although the Chechen project did garner an amount of interna-
tional sympathy, it lacked a powerful patron, and when Russia launched the second war in 
1999, the separatist regime was crushed (at this stage it had also been seriously weakened by 
the continued infighting among various warlords).  
97  Authors’ interviews, Tskhinvali, September 2006. A ‘Memorandum on measures for provid-
ing security and joint confidence’ was signed in 1996 in which the two sides renounced the 
future use of force. President Eduard Shevardnadze met with de facto president Lyudvig 
Chibirov on several occasions, and there were also meetings between government officials. 
98  From a state-building point of view, however, the 1990s have been described as a lost dec-
ade. When interviewed in Tskhinvali in September 2006, several of our sources claimed that 
the amicable relations had lulled Tskhinvali into de-prioritizing the development of South 
Ossetian statehood. 
99  Adjara had not officially declared secessionist ambitions, but had been outside Tbilisi’s reach, 
being ruled by local strongman Aslan Abashidze from 1991 to 2004. 
100  Like the infamous statement by then Georgian Minister of Defence Irakli Okruashvili about 
celebrating New Year 2007 in Tskhinvali. Okruashvili promised to step down if he failed to 
bring South Ossetia under Georgian control by the end of 2006. (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008) 
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in August 2008. Ultimately, this policy proved highly counterproductive, 
driving South Ossetia further into the arms of its patron state, Russia. 
Since the August war, Tbilisi has had limited leverage on Tskhinvali, with 
the de facto authorities looking to Russia for security guarantees, finan-
cial assistance and support for reconstruction of the republic. The border 
crossings at the de facto border remain closed,101 and Tskhinvali main-
tains that the only legal way to cross into South Ossetia is through Rus-
sia. 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh represents the other end of the spectrum as regards 
relations with the parent state, with no civilian contact whatsoever across 
the de facto border. Since 1994, all communication and trade between 
Nagorno-Karabakh and the outside world have been redirected across 
the Lachin Corridor. The heavily militarized de facto border has been the 
scene of frequent violations of the ceasefire: since the conclusion of the 
1994 ceasefire there have been an estimated 3,000 fatalities (ICG 2009: 
1). Attempts to prepare the ground for talks by engaging in public diplo-
macy have been met with suspicion in both Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Azerbaijan proper,102 and at the governmental level Baku has refused to 
treat the de facto authorities as part to the conflict, insisting on negotiat-
ing directly with Yerevan. 
 
Abkhazia falls into an intermediate position: there has been considerable 
traffic across the de facto border at Inguri, but primarily connected with 
the above-mentioned daily or seasonal commuting of Georgian/ Mingre-
lian IDPs. With the incursion of pro-Georgian paramilitaries in 1998, the 
Gali region saw renewed hostilities and a new round of forced evictions, 
but since then the number of returnees and cross-border traffic has 
picked up again. The regime change in Georgia in 2003 had a negative 
impact on Sukhumi’s relations with Tbilisi: Georgian reintegration of 
Upper Kodori and the subsequent establishment of rivalling, pro-
Georgian Abkhazian authorities in this region led to fears in Sukhumi 
that Georgia might be contemplating restoring central control by military 
means.103 These fears seemed to be justified when Saakashvili ordered 
Georgian troops to re-take Tskhinvali in August 2008. Since the war, 
Sukhumi has tightened the border regime: free movement across the 
border crossing at Inguri is limited to holders of Russian and Abkhazian 
passports, whereas Georgian citizens must obtain a special permit, a pro-
cedure that is said to be time-consuming (ICG 2010a: 10–11).  
 
In January 2010, Georgian authorities adopted a ‘State Strategy on Occu-
pied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation’, followed up six 
                                                 
101  The sole exception is made for former residents of the Akhalgori region, who are allowed to 
travel back and forth to check on their property and to farm their plots (ICG 2010b: 3). 
102  Authors’ interview with NGO representatives in Stepanakert, September 2010. See also Shir-
inyan 2010. 
103  Authors’ interview with Head of Abkhazian Security Council Stanislav Lakoba, Sukhumi, 
September 2006. 
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months later by an action plan. Although the language of the strategy 
was less confrontational than what Georgian rhetoric had generally been 
over the last years – for instance, the Abkhazian de facto authorities were 
referred to not as ‘the puppet regime’ but as ‘the populations and/or au-
thorities in control of Abkhazia’ (quoted in ICG 2010a: 15) – and it re-
pudiated isolation as a way to pressure the breakaway regions, Sukhumi 
interpreted the initiative as merely another variation over the theme of 
engagement along terms dictated by Tbilisi. Tskhinvali currently seems 
even less interested in engaging with Tbilisi. In any case, the signals ema-
nating from Tbilisi stand in stark contrast to the bellicose rhetoric of 
Baku in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh.104  
 
Overall, Georgia’s attempt to solve the conflict with military means has 
proven highly counterproductive, seriously undermining any level of 
trust that once existed between the de facto authorities and Tbilisi. This 
may have served as a warning to Baku, dampening the latter’s belief in a 
military option. As to Georgia, in November 2010 Saakashvili unilaterally 
renounced the future use of force. Although both Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia expressed doubts about Saakashvili’s sincerity, they responded 
with similar declarations in early December 2010 (Crisis Watch 3 January 
2011). After two years of mostly fruitless negotiations (see below), this 
represented a small breakthrough in relations between the de facto states 
and their ‘parent’.  
The Patron States 
Whereas the secessionist regimes exploited the historic window of op-
portunity provided by the dissolution of the Soviet Union to break loose 
from their parent states, their continued survival as de facto independent 
states is intimately linked to the existence of patron states. Indeed, none 
of the de facto states in our sample would have been able to endure 
without the active support of their patrons. 
 
Most fundamentally, the patron states provide security guarantees. The 
secessionists won the initial war, but all three de facto states discussed 
here are micro-states, and today their armed forces would be no match 
for the Georgian, respectively Azerbaijani, military on their own. To 
‘freeze’ the status quo, they need the backing of external powers. Hence, 
despite their efforts to develop independent military capacities, the de 
facto states are net importers of security. 
 
For Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, one of the most important results of the 
2008 war was the change in perceptions of the security situation. Until 
then, Russia had formally recognized Georgia’s territorial integrity, and 
its military presence in both conflict zones had been presented as part of 
peacekeeping operations – in South Ossetia, within the Joint Peacekeep-
                                                 
104  For a discussion of the latter, see Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2010. 
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ing Forces consisting of Russian, Georgian and Ossetian personnel; in 
Abkhazia, under the umbrella of the CIS peacekeepers. In the August 
war, Russia demonstrated that it was both willing and able to protect the 
de facto states with military means. Even more importantly, Russia shed 
its pro forma neutrality and showed unequivocal support for the separa-
tist regimes: through its recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian 
statehood in late August 2008, Moscow extended tangible security guar-
antees, later bolstered through the conclusion of agreements on military 
cooperation. In February 2010, the Abkhazians agreed to lease the mili-
tary base in Gudauta (including the Bombora airfield)105 to Russia for 49 
years (RFE/RL Newsline 17 February 2010). Russia is also involved in 
developing naval facilities in Ochamchira. The current Russian military 
presence in the republic is estimated to be in the range of 4,000 to 5,000 
troops (this figure includes regular troops, border guards106 and security 
personnel) (ICG 2010a: 3; Felgenhauer 2010).107 In April, a similar 
agreement was concluded between Russia and South Ossetia. Here 
Western analysts estimate the number of Russian troops to be 3,000–
4,500 (not including FSB border guards) (ICG 2010b: 8). 
 
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the patron state – Armenia – has 
been a much more direct part to the conflict from the very beginning. 
Armenian troops fought alongside the Karabakhian irregulars during the 
war of secession, and although Stepanakert has built up a relatively large 
standing army,108 the continued presence of Armenian troops in Na-
gorno-Karabakh plays a vital role in reassuring the Karabakhian popula-
tion. The Armenian and Karabakhian armed forces are highly integrated, 
and any Azerbaijani attack on Nagorno-Karabakh would automatically 
be interpreted as an attack on Armenia. In addition, Stepanakert sees the 
recent extension of Russia’s right to use the military base in Gyumri in 
Northern Armenia as also providing a Russian security overlay.109  
 
But the role of the patron state is not limited to providing security: the 
de facto states rely on their patrons for financial assistance, trade and 
infrastructure. Despite the state-building efforts, the continued non-
recognition – or, in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, only partial 
recognition – bars the de facto authorities from realizing their full scale 
of obligations towards the population. To give but one example, the de 
facto authorities can issue ‘national’ passports, but these are valid only 
within the territory of the de facto states. For international travel, citi-
                                                 
105  Bombora is the largest military airfield in the South Caucasus, boasting a 4-km long runway. 
106  Russian FSB border guards are currently responsible for patrolling the de facto borders of 
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
107  In comparison, Abkhazia’s own standing army is believed to consist of 1,000 to 5,000 men 
(for various estimates, see ICG 2010a: 5). 
108  That is, as share of the total population. The standing forces are estimated to be in the range 
of 18,500 to 25,000, or 13–18% of the total population. 
109  Authors’ interviews in Stepanakert, September 2010. The lease on the base in Gyumri was 
initially to expire in 2020, but in August 2010 it was extended to 2044 (Grigoryan 2010b) 
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zens of the de facto state have to obtain citizenship of another state – 
and, in most cases, people will turn to the patron.110  
 
The de facto authorities rely on the parent state to solve a range of prac-
tical issues, as well as for financial support and trade. According to ICG 
estimates, Russia contributed half of Abkhazia’s state budget in 2010 
(ICG 2010a: 5). South Ossetia is even more dependent on Russia: 
Whereas Abkhazia has a rapidly recovering tourist industry,111 South Os-
setia has few resources of its own. Its strategic location along a main 
transit corridor across the Caucasus Mountains (the Roki Tunnel) is of 
limited use as long as relations with Tbilisi remain antagonistic – this 
once-important transport artery is now a cul-de-sac. The few industrial 
enterprises that exist operate at a fraction of capacity. As a result, 98.7% 
of the 2010 budget was covered by Russian aid, according to the ICG 
(2010b: 4).112 As regards Nagorno-Karabakh, economic support is given 
in the form of annual state loans over the Armenian budget. In addition, 
the Armenian diaspora extends valuable contributions to various infra-
structure programmes – the high growth rates of the Karabakhian econ-
omy over the last years have primarily been diaspora-driven.  
 
The state- and nation-building efforts of the de facto states cannot be 
properly understood except within the dynamic context of their relation-
ship with their patron states. To write off the de facto states as mere 
pawns in the attempts of their patron states to win strategic positions 
and influence – as is frequently done – is nevertheless too simplistic. At 
least among the ethnic Abkhaz there seems to be a genuine will to pur-
sue independent statehood: they try to keep the Russian patron at arm’s 
length even if it means missing out on economic development.113 Still, it 
is beyond doubt that the patron states hold a key to the settlement of the 
conflicts. 
External Actors and Attempts at Conflict Resolution 
Of the three South Caucasian secessionist conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh 
has seen the least international presence. The OSCE has since 1995 run a 
small but important field operation out of Tbilisi (the location was cho-
                                                 
110  Likewise there are restrictions on communications: postage stamps are not recognized; air 
companies are prevented from flying to the de facto states; and the de facto states cannot ob-
tain their own country codes for telecommunication. As for trade and economic cooperation, 
no international treaties apply on the territory of the de facto states; and if they introduce 
their own currency, this is not recognized as legal tender outside of the borders of the de 
facto states. 
111  Abkhazia is a popular destination for Russian tourists, especially for the lower middle class, 
as it is quite affordable. As the security situation improved after the 2008 war, the number of 
tourists soon picked up again, reaching 1 million in 2009 (ICG 2010a: 6). 
112  Russian financial support after recognition has been massive. According to ICG, it amounts 
to approximately USD 28,000 per capita (ICG 2010b: 6) 
113  In interviews in Sukhumi in September 2010, several of our informants claimed that the 
Abkhazian side was willing to forfeit some of the opportunities to cash in on the Sochi 
Olympics if that could prevent the Russians from making too big inroads in the Abkhazian 
economy. 
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sen to ensure neutrality): the entire team consists of no more than six 
international staff, three of which rotate through field offices in Baku, 
Yerevan and Stepanakert.114 The field staff regularly monitor the ap-
proximately 220-km de facto border, and have for the last 15 years re-
presented the only confidence- and security-building measure carried out 
in the military sphere (Colloudon 2010). 
 
In the two other conflicts, the parties have been more open to interna-
tional involvement. Not only did they agree to allow peacekeeping opera-
tions, also the UN and the OSCE were present in the conflict zone. Up 
to the 2008 war, the UN through UNOMIG (the UN Observer Mission 
in Georgia) seconded close to 250 international staff, including 145 uni-
formed personnel, to monitor observance of the ceasefire in the security 
zone and the Kodori Valley. In South Ossetia, the OSCE Mission was 
engaged in promoting practical cooperation between the parties as well 
as monitoring the conflict zone. In the aftermath of the war, however, 
Russia’s recognition of the two secessionist regimes meant that Moscow 
and the UN/OSCE no longer had a shared understanding of the situa-
tion on the ground. In the summer of 2009, referring to ‘the new reali-
ties’, Moscow vetoed the extension of the mandates of both UNOMIG 
and the OSCE Mission.  
 
In 2008, the EU established its own monitoring mission, at the time 
complementing the UN and the OSCE. The EUMM, almost 300-strong, 
has established field offices in Gori, Zugdidi and Mtskheta. So far, how-
ever, the de facto authorities in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali have not 
granted the EUMM access to territories under their control. Conse-
quently, the 2008 war has resulted in a much weaker international pres-
ence and very limited possibilities for third parties to monitor develop-
ments within the de facto states. 
 
Concerning conflict resolution, the negotiation format for the Abkhazian 
and South Ossetian conflicts has since the 2008 war been the ‘Geneva 
Talks’. The commencement of these talks was part of the package agreed 
to by presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitrii Medvedev in September 
2008 to follow up the 12 August ceasefire agreement – internationally 
mediated talks on security guarantees for the two republics (Fuller 2008). 
The talks involve Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and are 
supported by the UN, EU and OSCE. Georgia initially wanted to nego-
tiate with Russia as the sole counterpart, but Moscow insisted on the in-
clusion of the de facto states within the official format. This was seen as 
a logical consequence of Russia having recognized Abkhazia and South 
                                                 
114  The operation is led by the ‘Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on 
the Conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference’. The awkward name serves to illus-
trate the difficulties in establishing common terms of reference between the conflicting par-
ties. 
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Ossetia as independent states.115 Lumping together Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in one process may in the longer run complicate the negotia-
tions, as progress with solving one conflict may be thwarted by resis-
tance from the other de facto state. Up to now, the talks have produced 
very few tangible results. Besides the very fact that parties, on a regular 
basis, sit together around the negotiating table, the most concrete result 
so far is the October 2010 Russian withdrawal from Perevi, a village in 
Georgia proper that was never claimed by the de facto authorities.116 
 
In order to introduce some momentum, the EU in December 2009 
adopted a non-paper on the parameters for engagement and non-
recognition. The aim was to draw up guidelines for how the EU could 
interact with Abkhazia and South Ossetia without compromising its offi-
cial stand on non-recognition. This new approach is based on an under-
standing that the EU has to engage with the de facto states in order to 
increase its leverage – as long as the EU involvement is limited to the 
EUMM operation in Georgia proper, Brussels has few carrots and sticks 
that can be applied in Sukhumi or Tskhinvali to move confidence-
building, let alone conflict resolution, forward. That there is a fine and 
difficult line between engagement and recognition is illustrated by a 
statement made by a leading Abkhazian government official, who 
claimed that the ‘only reason we are participating in the Geneva discus-
sions is because every time we sit down at the table, it is another act of 
recognition of our independence’ (quoted in ICG 2010a: 14). 
 
With regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, the main platform for negotiations 
has been the OSCE Minsk Group, established already in 1992, at the 
height of the war of secession. The Minsk Group is chaired by a troika 
consisting of France, Russia and the United States, and has sponsored 
numerous initiatives over the years. During the 2001 Key West talks, the 
parties were reportedly close to a breakthrough, but negotiations stalled 
after President Heydar Aliev transferred power to his son Ilham (de 
Waal 2009).  
 
The repercussions of the 2008 war also reached Nagorno-Karabakh. In 
November 2008, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to intensify their ef-
forts to reach a solution, and significant progress was made over the next 
year, following an unprecedented number of meetings between the two 
presidents (ICG 2009).117 As it became increasingly clear that the recog-
nition of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia had not established a 
precedent that would apply to Nagorno-Karabakh – and, in a parallel 
process, attempts at Armenian–Turkish rapprochement failed – this 
window of opportunity again closed. Questions of timing and coupling 
                                                 
115  Georgia has, on the other hand, included the pro-Georgian Abkhaz government in exile and 
the provisional South Ossetian administration in their delegation. 
116  The unilateral declarations on abstention from the use of power were made outside the Ge-
neva Talks format. 
117  The Armenian president also negotiates on behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
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of the various elements of a peace plan remain highly contested, not least 
in Nagorno-Karabakh.118 
 
When the South Caucasian secessionist conflicts are described as ‘frozen’ 
(see e.g. Blank 2008), this refers primarily to the lack of progress towards 
conflict resolution. Although the 2008 war seemed to ‘unfreeze’ the con-
flicts for a while, today mutually accepted negotiated solutions seem to 
be even further away than before.  
Conclusion: The Emergence of a New Permanent State-
like Category? 
In the case of Kosovo, the declaration of independence was followed by 
extensive, albeit far from universal, recognition.119 In South Caucasus the 
de facto states have had less success in breaking the international resis-
tance to their claims for statehood: as yet, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
have been recognized by only four states – the Russian Federation, Nica-
ragua, Venezuela and Nauru – and Nagorno-Karabakh by none.  
 
The three states that have followed Russia’s lead and recognized 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have no particular interests of their own in 
the region, and their acts of recognition are claimed to be motivated by 
Russian involvement.120 It came as somewhat of a negative surprise that 
Moscow was not able to convince other CIS states of the need to recog-
nize the two breakaway entities. Even Belarus, which at one point was 
rumoured to be contemplating following in Russia’s footsteps, has stub-
bornly refused. Although the Abkhazian de facto Minister of Foreign 
Affairs has expressed some optimism about the prospects of winning 
wider recognition,121 most local observers are rather pessimistic. As 
South Ossetian ambitions have been more oriented towards joining their 
ethnic brethren in North Ossetia (and such a reunification would obvi-
ously have to take place within the framework of the Russian Federa-
tion), Tskhinvali has been less active in attempting to penetrate the re-
cognition embargo. Overall, however, recognition has so far proved 
somewhat a mixed blessing for Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Even 
though it represented a major breakthrough in consolidating independ-
                                                 
118 In interviews in Stepanakert and Yerevan, September 2010, we were told that if Yerevan were 
perceived as giving up too much in the negotiations, there would be a danger that some ele-
ments within the Karabakhian elite might revolt and derail the process by provoking war. 
119 By the end of 2010, 72 states had recognized Kosovo as an independent state. In addition to 
most NATO and EU members, this group includes Australia, New Zealand and several Pa-
cific micro-states. Among the states that have so far refused to recognize the new regime in 
Prishtina are two of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China. 
Support is also weak throughout most of Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
120 According to the ICG, the acts of recognition have been followed by Russian credits (in the 
case of Venezuela and Nauru) and arms and energy deals (Venezuela and Nicaragua) (ICG 
2010b: 9). 
121 Authors’ interview with Maksim Gunja, Abkhazian de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs, Suk-
humi, September 2010. 
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ent statehood, it has made the two much more dependent on Russia than 
prior to the official recognition.122 
 
In Nagorno-Karabakh, the de facto authorities for years pursued a policy 
informed by ‘standards before status’, that is, that the adoption of inter-
national standards would eventually qualify them for international recog-
nition (Caspersen 2008a). The failure of the international community to 
abide by this principle in the case of Kosovo forced Stepanakert to re-
consider its approach. As it became clear that, for the foreseeable future, 
recognition would not be on the international agenda, the de facto au-
thorities had to reorient themselves – and the expectations of the popu-
lation – from a focus on recognition, to consolidating the status quo. In 
order to justify this policy shift, Karabakhian authorities frequently refer 
to the example of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and question whether 
anything good came out of this recognition.123 There also appears to be 
widespread agreement in Stepanakert that recognition by their own pa-
tron, Armenia, is meaningless as long as there are no guarantees that 
others will follow suit.  
 
Almost two decades have now passed since the wars of secession. In the 
meantime, the secessionists have turned into state-builders and nation-
builders. Both ambitions and the level of success have varied among the 
three de facto states. Nagorno-Karabakh is functioning relatively well, 
while the South Ossetian state project has experienced a sharp down-
ward turn since 2004. Although the prospects for widespread interna-
tional recognition might seem even bleaker today than at the time of se-
cession, in the de facto states, time is nevertheless seen as working to 
their advantage: for each year they manage to hold onto their de facto 
status, the higher the practical barriers to reintegration will grow. 
 
The de facto states are thus oriented to the status quo: even if interna-
tional recognition may be their ultimate goal, most other alternatives 
would appear worse than what they currently have. While the interna-
tional community insists on finding solutions to the conflicts that can 
respect the territorial integrity of the parent state, the worst-thinkable 
scenario for the de facto states would be re-absorption by these states – 
at least, if not accompanied with far-reaching autonomy, veto powers in 
the national parliament and credible security guarantees.124 For the time 
being, it seems that the de facto states have come to stay, and that the 
international community will have to learn to live with a situation in 
which sovereignty is not a matter of either–or, but of degrees, with 
states/statelike entities dispersed along a continuum ranging from no 
recognition, through partial, and to full recognition. 
                                                 
122  In our meetings, Abkhazians would frequently appeal to the Western world for recognition, 
arguing that continued non-recognition would only drive Abkhazia deeper into Russia’s pow-
erful embrace. 123  Authors’ interviews in Stepanakert, September 2010. 124  The experience of other restive regions, such as Adjara, serves to underline this point. After 
that region was reintegrated into Georgia, all meaningful autonomy was eliminated (Graham 
2009). 
Findings and Recommendations  
The Region 
x The Black Sea is an arena of cross-cutting and intersecting initia-
tives of regional cooperation, but the potential for cooperative 
arrangements seems overshadowed by interest-driven policies 
and bilateral ad-hoc alliances.  
x New initiatives appear to defy some of the old conventions and 
established patterns of cooperation, and energy relations and bi-
lateral relations are in flux. 
Turkey 
x Turkish policy makers take for granted that Turkey will become 
a major player in the energy market. 
x Turkey’s current approach to regional cooperation is based on 
the principle of ‘more is better’ and ‘the more, the merrier’. 
x Policy decisions regarding energy are made within the executive 
branch, with the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being the main decision makers. 
x What statements come out of the executive branch are pre-
packaged and give little room for discussion of energy policy, 
whether in the Parliament or in the media. 
Ukraine 
x Ukraine will increasingly face a transit conundrum: energy short-
ages and budget deficits will bring it closer to Russia, while the 
EU will be more reluctant to invest in transit infrastructure. 
x Russia has gained leverage on Ukraine since the 2010 elections 
and is becoming a more influential regional player in the Black 
Sea region. 
South Caucasus: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh 
x To prevent the outbreak of a new war, the parties to the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conflict should be encouraged to follow the 
example of Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali and renounce the 
use of force as a means of conflict resolution. 
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x Since the 2008 war, there has been a very low level of interna-
tional presence/engagement in all three de facto states, and 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are rapidly reorienting themselves 
towards Russia. To counterbalance this trend, the international 
community should encourage Georgia to become involved in 
constructive engagement across the de facto borders. 
x To ensure that the Karabakhians will respect the outcome of a 
possible future settlement between Baku and Yerevan, represen-
tatives of Stepanakert should be included in the negotiation 
format (to balance the format, representatives of the Azerbaijani 
IDPs could also be included). 
x All de facto states should be strongly encouraged to allow the 
return of IDPs, and also to facilitate cross-border movement. 
There are varying dynamics at play in the individual conflicts; as 
a first step, the international community should probably give 
priority to the less controversial returns (Georgians to Gali and 
Akhalgori), while making it clear that the de facto states are 
obliged to accept the return of the entire IDP population. 
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